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THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. XV, NO. 374

SEPTEMBER 1, 1946

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Agreements and Treaties Concluded by the U.S.S.R. in 1945

Article by RAYMOND H. FISHER¹

I

THE Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, like various other governments, has conducted negotiations in the last year or two to restore treaty obligations that were interrupted by the war and to revise or expand the pattern of existing international commitments. The texts of certain Soviet political agreements of general international interest have appeared in the BULLETIN from time to time, such as the treaties signed with France, December 10, 1944,² with Yugoslavia, April 11, 1945,³ with Poland, April 21 and August 16, 1945,⁴ with China, August 14, 1945,⁵ and with the Mongolian People's Republic, February 27, 1946.⁶

In the course of the year 1945 the Soviet Union concluded a number of agreements, most of which

¹ Dr. Fisher, formerly County Specialist in the Division of Eastern European Affairs, Office of European Affairs, Department of State, will be a member of the history department of the University of California at Los Angeles.

² Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the U.S.S.R. and the French Republic. BULLETIN of Jan. 7, 1945, p. 39.

³ Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Aid and Post-War Cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia. BULLETIN of Apr. 11, 1945, p. 774.

⁴ Agreement regarding Friendship, Mutual Assistance and Post-War Cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the Polish Republic (Apr. 21, 1945); Treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the Polish Republic on the Soviet-Polish State Frontier (Aug. 16, 1945); Agreement and Protocol between the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Provisional Government of National Unity of the Polish Republic on Compensation for Damages Caused by German Occupation (Aug. 16, 1945). BULLETIN of Mar. 3, 1946, p. 340.

are economic in character. The following account contains summaries of these agreements, as they have been announced in press reports in this and in the contracting countries. No attempt, however, is made to appraise the degree to which the terms appearing on paper have or have not been carried out.

II

Albania

An exchange of notes restoring formal diplomatic relations appears to be the only engagement in the nature of an agreement which the U.S.S.R. concluded with Albania during 1945. The decision of the Soviet Government to reestablish diplomatic relations with Albania and to invite the exchange of ministers was communicated on November 9 by Colonel Sokolov, Chief of the Soviet

⁵ Treaty of Friendship and Alliance between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R.; Exchange of Notes relating to the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance; Exchange of Notes on Outer Mongolia; Agreement concerning Dairen; Protocol to the Agreement on Dairen; Agreement on Port Arthur; Appendix to "Agreement on Port Arthur"; Agreement regarding Relations between Chinese Administration and the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Forces after the Entry of Soviet Troops into the "Three Eastern Provinces" of China during the Present Joint Military Operations against Japan; Agreement between the Republic of China and the U.S.S.R. concerning the Chinese Changchun Railway—all signed August 14, 1945. BULLETIN of Feb. 10, 1946, p. 201.

⁶ Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the U.S.S.R. and the Mongolian People's Republic; Agreement on Economic and Cultural Collaboration between the Government of the U.S.S.R. and the Government of the Mongolian People's Republic. BULLETIN of June 2, 1946, p. 968.

Military Mission in Albania, to General Enver Hoxha, President of the Council of Ministers of Albania. General Hoxha expressed satisfaction at the announcement and readiness to exchange envoys.

Bulgaria

Two trade agreements and the restoration of diplomatic relations constitute the formal engagements entered into between Bulgaria and the U.S.S.R. during 1945. On March 14-15 representatives of the Soviet and Bulgarian Governments signed at Moscow a trade agreement and five accompanying annexes. The agreement contained a schedule of goods to be exported by each country to the other. Soviet exports to Bulgaria were to include metals, petroleum products, cotton, rubber, industrial and agricultural machinery, chemicals, paper, cellulose, hay, oats, medicines. Bulgarian exports to the Soviet Union were to be tobacco particularly, agricultural products, vegetable oils, ores, cotton goods.

A supplementary trade agreement between the two countries was signed on December 15 at Sofia. By this agreement the U.S.S.R. undertook to supply Bulgaria with 30,000 metric tons of wheat, deliveries to begin immediately and to be finished by April 1, 1946. The Bulgarian Government agreed to repay these amounts by April 1, 1947.¹

In April of this year a protocol supplementary to the March 1945 agreement was signed which provided for the completion of Soviet deliveries to Bulgaria under the 1945 agreement. Included for delivery were 13,250 tons of petroleum products, 22,650 tons of ferrous metals, 250 tons of light metals, 9,903 tons of chemicals, 22,000 tons of fertilizer, 12,400 tons of cellulose paper, and an electric-power station of 12,000 watts.

During the summer of 1945 diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria were resumed. On August 14 Colonel-General Biryuzov, Vice Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria, on behalf of the Soviet Government informed Mr. Kimon Georgiev, the Prime Minister of Bulgaria, of the decision of the Soviet Government to reestablish diplomatic relations with Bulgaria and proposed the exchange of min-

isters. The Bulgarian expressed agreement and satisfaction.

Czechoslovakia

Treaty relations between the U.S.S.R. and Czechoslovakia in 1945 were unique in that they involved the cession of territory. On June 29 at Moscow representatives of the two governments signed the treaty and protocol on Transcarpathian Ukraine. Ratification by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. occurred on November 27, 1945; exchange of ratifications took place on January 30, 1946. This treaty ceded the province called by the Czechs "Subcarpathian Ruthenia"—and thereafter to be known as "Transcarpathian Ukraine"—to the Ukrainian S.S.R. The new boundary between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union was, with minor modifications, the frontier existing on September 29, 1938 between Slovakia and Subcarpathian Ruthenia. The protocol provided for a demarcation commission consisting of three representatives from each side to mark the boundary on the spot. It also provided that persons of Russian or Ukrainian nationality residing in the Slovak districts of Czechoslovakia could, until January 1, 1946, with permission of the Soviet authorities opt for Soviet citizenship, and persons of Slovak or Czech nationality having permanent residence in Transcarpathian Ukraine could, until January 1, 1946, with permission of the Czechoslovak authorities opt for Czechoslovak citizenship. Those utilizing the right of option were to move, within 12 months after receiving consent of the respective government, to the state whose citizenship they were to acquire. They were to be permitted to take their movable property with them. For their immovable property they were to be compensated, as also were persons of Czech or Slovak nationality who were compelled to leave Transcarpathian Ukraine in consequence of enemy occupation; to these persons belong juridical persons regarded as Czechs or Slovaks by virtue of their legal organs prior to the occupation. A liquidation commission, composed of representatives from each high contracting party, was to be established to handle the questions of law, property, and finance involved in the transfer of territory, as well as compensations for immovable property. Liquidation of all compensations was to be completed 18 months from date of ratification of the treaty.

¹ According to a press report from Sofia, dated June 8, 1946, the Soviet Union has released Bulgaria from the obligation to return the 50,000 [sic] tons of wheat loaned last year.

Late in August 1945 a Czechoslovak trade mission negotiated a trade agreement in Moscow with the Soviet Government. Signed, reportedly, on September 8, this agreement was preliminary in character, since it applied only to the period remaining in 1945, although it appears to have been continued tacitly until a new agreement, valid for one year from date of signing, was concluded on April 12, 1946. In general the September agreement called for an exchange of raw materials from the Soviet Union in exchange for machinery and industrial goods from Czechoslovakia. Among the products to be supplied by the Soviet Union were iron ore, manganese, chromium ore, cotton, rice, fats and other foods, flax, wool, coal from the Waldenburg basin in former German territory, gasoline and other oil products, pyrites, and rock salt. Czechoslovakia was to deliver to the Soviet Union machine tools, electrotechnical products, rolling mills, harvesting and other light machinery, locomotives, and electric motors.

Of minor significance was an agreement signed on October 21 between the People's Commissariat for Communications of the U.S.S.R. and the Czechoslovak Ministry for Post Offices on the resumption of normal postal, telegraph, and telephone communications between the two countries.

Finland

Finland was the first country to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union in 1945 when on January 31 representatives of the two countries signed a commodities-exchange agreement in Moscow. Under its terms the U.S.S.R. was to deliver to Finland, by June 1, 1945, 5,000 tons of wheat, 25,000 tons of rye, 1,000 tons of sugar, 50 tons of chocolate, 250 tons of other sweets. The total value of the stipulated Soviet deliveries to Finland was around \$2,260,000 (American). Finland was to deliver to the U.S.S.R. chiefly nickel, cobalt, and sulfur ore. Finland was also to repair at its Helsinki and Aabo shipyards Soviet naval vessels, with the value of such repair work estimated at \$1,100,000. The exchange of goods was to take place directly between the two governments, the Supply Ministry to be the Government agency responsible in Finland. A. I. Mikoyan, as Commissar for Foreign Trade, signed the agreement for the Soviet Government.

A second economic agreement between the two

countries, a trade agreement, was signed in Moscow on May 8, 1945. By this agreement the Soviet Union was in the course of the year to supply Finland with another 5,000 tons of wheat and 25,000 tons of rye, as well as fuel and lubricating oils, kerosene, salt, apatite, leather products, and 500 metric tons of tobacco. Finland's obligations called for sending paper, cellulose, and pre-fabricated wooden houses to the Soviet Union. A total turn-over of \$17,000,000 (American) was anticipated.

The commercial negotiations between the Soviet Union and Finland were of a continuing nature, with the result that a third and supplementary agreement was signed in Moscow on August 11, 1945. According to this agreement the U.S.S.R. was to send to Finland, during the period ending in June 1946, cereals, salt, coal, coke, fuel and lubricating oils, apatite, sugar, tobacco, fodder cakes, and certain other products not named. As before, Finland was to pay for them by exporting to the Soviet Union cellulose, paper, cardboard, and paper products.

During that month diplomatic relations between Finland and the U.S.S.R. were resumed. On August 6 Colonel General Zhdanov, Chairman of the Control Commission in Finland, announced that the Soviet Government had decided to establish diplomatic relations with Finland and requested the exchange of ministers. The Finnish Government replied on the same day, expressing agreement and satisfaction.

The next agreements between the two countries concerned the boundary readjustment at Petsamo. On October 26 the Soviet and Finnish Delegations on the Joint Soviet-Finnish Commission for demarcation of the frontier between the U.S.S.R. and Finland in the district of Pechenga (Petsamo) signed the documents demarcating the frontier.⁸ At the same time a protocol defining the place of meeting of the frontiers of the U.S.S.R., Finland, and Norway was signed by representatives of the Soviet and Finnish Delegations in joint committee and by a Norwegian representative.

Finland was also the last country to sign an agreement with the Soviet Union in 1945. On December 31 the two countries concluded an agree-

⁸ The boundary itself is defined in the armistice agreement of Sept. 19, 1944, which appeared in the BULLETIN of Feb. 18, 1945, p. 261.

ment prolonging the period of reparations payments by two years, from six to eight years, and permitting a reduction in the annual reparations instalments. The reduction in 1946 will amount to about \$15,000,000 (American).

France

A trade agreement between France and U.S.S.R. was signed at Moscow on December 29, 1945.^{8a} Instruments of ratification were exchanged at Paris on May 2, 1946. The agreement, which was to run for five years, contains mutual most-favored-nation clauses with regard to the exchange of goods, navigation, and the status of juridical and physical persons engaging in trade transactions under the agreement. The legal status of the trade representatives of the Soviet Union is defined and the establishment of commercial missions in the capitals of both countries provided for.

According to the Moscow press "this agreement permits the renewal and development, in accordance with the desire of both Governments over a prolonged period of time, of trade relations between the U.S.S.R. and France, in the degree to which both countries shall possess goods and raw materials for export." Omitting any mention of specific commodities to be exchanged, this treaty, unlike the trade agreements with Bulgaria, Rumania, and other countries, is apparently intended to provide only the framework within which the commercial relations between France and the Soviet Union are to be conducted whenever active trade between the two countries actually develops. The legal status accorded the Soviet trade delegation in France appears to be the most substantial part of this agreement.

Hungary

Economic matters were the subject of three agreements between the U.S.S.R. and the Provisional National Government of Hungary. The

^{8a} Text printed in *Journal Officiel*, June 20, 1946.

⁹ The text of this armistice agreement appeared in the *BULLETIN* of Jan. 21, 1945, p. 83.

¹⁰ The joint Soviet-Rumanian companies may be taken as a model since they were the first to be provided for and more is known about them.

¹¹ The agreements establishing a joint Soviet-Hungarian oil company and a joint Soviet-Hungarian company to exploit Hungary's bauxite resources were signed in Budapest on Apr. 8, 1946.

first agreement related to the fulfilment by Hungary of article 12 of the armistice agreement of January 20, 1945.⁹ It was an agreement on the delivery of goods by Hungary in reparation for damages inflicted by Hungary upon the Soviet Union through military operations and occupation of Soviet territory and was signed in Budapest on June 15, 1945. The delivery of 200 million American dollars' worth of goods provided for by article 12 of the armistice is to be made in equal proportions annually during the period from January 20, 1945 through January 20, 1951. The reparations agreement provides for deliveries of machine equipment, vessels, grain, livestock, and other articles. A detailed list of articles to be delivered and of the schedule of their delivery was drawn up. The cost of the articles to be delivered was determined according to 1938 prices in American dollars, with 15 percent added for industrial goods and 10 percent for other goods.

The second and third agreements between the Soviet Union and Hungary involved economic collaboration and reciprocal delivery of goods. These agreements were signed on August 27 in Moscow. By their terms the same kind of economic relations were established between these two countries as between the Soviet Union and Rumania.

The trade agreement provides for a bilateral exchange of goods for the period from September 1945 to December 31, 1946 to the value of about \$30,000,000. It also provides for the spinning of thread from Soviet raw cotton by Hungarian factories and their production of fabrics for the U.S.S.R.

The agreement on economic collaboration has as its announced purpose the facilitating of Soviet-Hungarian economic relations and the development of Hungary's economy through the means of joint Soviet-Hungarian organizations, after the pattern of the joint Soviet-Rumanian companies.¹⁰ Joint companies were to be set up in Hungary to (1) prospect for bauxite and undertake its manufacture into aluminum;¹¹ (2) prospect for petroleum and purchase refineries for its production;¹¹ (3) further coal production; (4) acquire and develop power plants; (5) develop the chemical industry, especially for the manufacture of commercial fertilizers; (6) develop the manufacturing of electrical and agricultural machinery; (7) de-

velop river,¹² motor, and air transport,¹² to this end acquiring ships, fostering air traffic, establishing automobile factories, and setting up a bank to finance these enterprises; and (8) establish an agricultural research center and a mechanization center, and arrange for the exchange of breeding stock between Hungary and the Soviet Union. The agreement, which is to run for five years, was signed on August 27, 1945 in Moscow. Ratification of the agreement by the Supreme National Council of Hungary occurred on December 20 and by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on December 26, 1945.

The month of September saw the resumption of formal diplomatic relations between Hungary and the U.S.S.R. On September 25 K. E. Voroshilov, Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary, informed Mr. Miklos, Prime Minister in the Provisional National Hungarian Government, of the Soviet Government's decision to reestablish diplomatic relations with Hungary and proposed the exchange of ministers. The Hungarian Government replied, expressing agreement with the decision and proposal.

Poland

The U.S.S.R. appears to have concluded more agreements during 1945 with Poland than with any other country. Three treaties, the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance of April 21, the Treaty on the Soviet-Polish State Frontier of August 16, and the Agreement and Protocol on Compensation for Damages Caused by German Occupation, also of August 16, have appeared in the BULLETIN.¹³

A fourth agreement concerned the mutual exchange of Polish and Soviet citizens. This agreement, with attached protocol, was signed in Moscow on July 6 by representatives of the U.S.S.R. and the Provisional Government of National Unity of the Polish Republic. It provided that persons of Polish and Jewish nationality who held Polish citizenship prior to September 17, 1939 and were currently residing on Soviet territory, as well as members of their families, might move to Poland, withdrawing from Soviet citizenship. The right of resettlement was extended also to persons of Polish nationality described in the decrees of June 22 and July 14, 1944 of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.¹⁴ Persons of Russian, Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Ruthenian, and

Lithuanian nationality living on the territory of Poland, and members of their families, might surrender their Polish citizenship and resettle on Soviet territory. Surrender of citizenship and resettlement were to be voluntary. Those persons relinquishing Polish citizenship were to apply before November 20, 1945 to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet or, if outside of the Soviet Union, to the appropriate embassy or legation. Persons relinquishing Polish citizenship were to apply before November 1, 1945 to the responsible local authorities. A mixed Soviet-Polish Commission, consisting of three appointees from each country and sitting in Moscow, was to coordinate this agreement, register persons subject to the agreement, and appoint plenipotentiaries at the departure centers. The transfer of persons was to be completed by December 31, 1945. The technical details were embodied in the protocol attached to the agreement. The emigrants were to have the right to take with them property up to two tons for each family for rural persons and up to one ton for urban persons; persons of special professions could take with them the articles used in their professional activity. Emigrants could take with them a maximum of 1,000 rubles or zloty. The agreement did not alter the provisions of the agreements of September 9 and 22, 1944 between the Polish Committee of National Liberation and the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republics concerning the mutual exchange of population.

Four other agreements between the Soviet Union and Poland are economic in character. On July 7, 1945 two documents were signed in Moscow. One is the Commercial Treaty between the U.S.S.R. and the Polish Republic. It provides for the development and strengthening by both countries of economic relations between them in the spirit of friendship and collaboration and sets forth the principle of most-favored-nation treatment, to be accorded to both sides. The other is an agreement for the mutual delivery of goods be-

¹² The agreements establishing a joint Soviet-Hungarian civil-aviation company and a joint Soviet-Hungarian navigation company were signed in Budapest on Mar. 29, 1946.

¹³ See above, n. 4.

¹⁴ These decrees allowed persons of Polish nationality serving in the Polish Army in the U.S.S.R. or aiding it, and their families, to acquire Polish citizenship.

tween the U.S.S.R. and the Polish Republic. Under its terms Soviet goods were to be delivered to Poland and Polish goods to the Soviet Union during the second half of 1945 to a total value of about \$128,000,000 (American). Poland was to deliver to the Soviet Union 5,000,000 tons of coal and coke, 67,000 tons of steel and iron, 5,000 tons of zinc, 70,000 tons of cement, and 25,000 tons of calcined soda, as well as cotton and wool fabrics manufactured from raw materials supplied by the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was to deliver 250,000 tons of iron ore, 30,000 tons of manganese ores, 25,000 tons of cotton, 3,000 tons of tobacco, 2,400 tons of flax, 40,000 of apatites, cellulose, paper, and a number of other commodities.

A third and fourth agreement related to railroads. One, signed on July 11, 1945 in Moscow, concerned the alteration of the system of administration of the railroads in Poland and provided for the transfer of the Polish railroads, by stages, from the Soviet authorities who administered them during the wartime period to the Polish Ministry of Communications, beginning August 1, 1945. The other was an agreement signed in Moscow on November 23, 1945 between the People's Commissariat (now Ministry) of Communications in the U.S.S.R. and the Ministry of Communications in the Polish Republic on Soviet-Polish direct railway communication. In the agreement provisions are made for conditions of transport, tariffs, conditions for the use of rolling stock, accounts, responsibility for the custody of goods in transit, and conditions of transport between the Soviet occupation zone in Germany and the Soviet Union by Polish railways.

Rumania

Rumania and the U.S.S.R. concluded a number of agreements during 1945, all but two of them relating to economic matters. The first of these was the agreement signed in Moscow on January 16 concerning the fulfilment of article 11 of the armistice agreement of September 12, 1944.¹⁵ The agreement of January 16 provided that the sum of \$300,000,000 (American) stipulated in article

11 of the armistice agreement was to be paid during the period from September 12, 1944 to September 12, 1950, i.e. in six equal instalments over the period of six years. Provided for in the deliveries under these instalments were \$150,000,000 worth of petroleum products and \$54,000,000 worth of ocean-going and river vessels and diverse machine and railway equipment, as well as \$13,000,000 in cash. The cost of the goods delivered was to be determined on the basis of 1938 prices in American dollars, with an increase in these prices of 15 percent for machine and railway equipment and for ships, and 10 percent for all other goods. A detailed list of goods to be delivered, as well as the periods of their delivery, was set forth in the agreement.

The next agreements known to have been concluded by the Soviet Union and Rumania were those signed in Moscow on May 8. They consist of a trade agreement and an agreement on economic collaboration. The latter runs for five years from the date of the exchange of ratifications, which occurred on July 16 in Bucharest, with tacit prolongation unless denounced by one of the parties on one year's notice.

The agreement on economic collaboration is extensive in its application, calling for "the participation of Soviet capital and technical assistance in the intensification of Rumanian economic activity". This was to be done by establishing joint Soviet-Rumanian companies whose boards were to consist half of Rumanian and half of Soviet personnel; the president of the board and the assistant general manager were to be Rumanian, the deputy president and general manager Soviet. The capital of the joint companies was to be held equally between the Soviets and the Rumanian investors (both private and state). A joint bank was to be set up in Bucharest, with the right to extensive activities.¹⁶ The Rumanian oil companies were to be made to enter a joint Soviet-Rumanian oil concern for the "exploration, exploitation, processing, and commercialization of petroleum and petroleum products". The Rumanian Government was to cede to this company a half share in the crude-petroleum royalties accruing to the Rumanian Government under previous conditions, as well as what appear to be exclusive boring rights on Rumanian territory not previously conceded to foreign oil interests. The

¹⁵ The text of the armistice agreement appeared in the BULLETIN of Sept. 17, 1944, p. 289.

¹⁶ The agreement establishing this bank was signed on Aug. 15, 1945.

Soviet Government was to contribute the necessary oilfield equipment.¹⁷

The agreement provides also for the development of river and maritime navigation by a Soviet-Rumanian company. The Rumanian Government was to cede to the joint company the exclusive rights, on a rental basis, for the use of the harbor, ship repair, and shipbuilding installations in the ports of Constanta, Braila, Galatz, and Giurgiu. Certain Soviet administrative organs, the Maritime Register of the U.S.S.R., the administration of the State Insurance of the U.S.S.R. (*Gostrakh*), and transport and delivery organizations of the U.S.S.R. were to have the right to carry out operations on Rumanian territory in line with the general agreement.¹⁸

Certain provisions of the agreement look toward the economic development of Rumania. The Soviet Government is to cooperate fully with the Rumanian Government in the construction of new hydroelectric power plants and the general electrification of Rumania. A Soviet-Rumanian agricultural research institute is to be set up, exchanges of experts and technicians are to take place, and agricultural machinery and implements are to be supplied by the U.S.S.R.

Another joint company on the half-and-half basis was to be created for the development of air transport and civil aviation generally. The Rumanian Government was to provide the necessary airfields and installations and land for the construction of new airfields; the Soviet Government was to provide the airplanes. Each Government accorded the other the right to fly over its territory.¹⁹

The agreement also stipulates that other companies were to be set up, after two months' investigation, for joint development of the Rumanian timber, glass, mining, and metallurgical industries. In compensation for the iron ore taken from Krivoi Rog by the steel and engineering works of Resita, the Rumanian Government was to facilitate the acquisition by the respective Soviet organization of shares in these works "at least equal in value" to the quantities of iron ore taken. (This would amount to about 42 percent of the shares.)

Wherever the Soviets were not in a position to supply the plant necessary for the development of these joint enterprises, they were to make avail-

able to the Rumanians the means of payment for purchases elsewhere. Under article 4 the Rumanian Government was to assist in the processing of raw materials supplied by the U.S.S.R. In that connection, the agreement provided, 20,000 tons of raw cotton were to be sent to Rumania during the first year of the agreement for manufacture into goods to be returned to the Soviet Union. The U.S.S.R. was also to make available 2,000 tractors, which, under article 12 of the armistice agreement, were to be returned to the Soviet Union.

The trade agreement between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania was of the usual order, calling for a mutual exchange of goods on the basis of barter, i.e. the value of the imports was to equal the value of the exports. The operations were to be liquidated for imports through the Moscow State Bank and for exports through the National Bank of Rumania. Payments were to be regulated on the dollar rate of the day of the signature of the agreement, the then current (May 1945) world prices being taken as a basis. Balances were to be examined every three months in order to stimulate imports or exports, should they not be in equilibrium.

According to the terms of this agreement (1) the Soviets undertook to facilitate the importation into Rumania of ball bearings from Sweden and cigaret paper from Finland; (2) the Soviets were to ship 40,000 tons of cotton to Constanta in Soviet transport vessels, which were to take Rumanian exports to Soviet ports; (3) of the 40,000 tons of cotton, 20,000 tons were to go into Rumanian internal consumption and the other 20,000 tons to be returned to the U.S.S.R. as manufactured goods; (4) the Soviets undertook to supply later 1,000 tons of wool, 25,000 tons of semi-manufactured steel, and 1,000 tons of bar copper.

¹⁷ The agreement establishing the Soviet-Rumanian company for the exploration, extraction, refining, and sale of oil and oil products was signed in Bucharest on July 17, 1945. The agreement was ratified by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on Aug. 17, 1945.

¹⁸ The Soviet-Rumanian Navigation Company (*Sovrom-transport*) was established by an agreement signed in Bucharest on July 19, 1945. It was ratified by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on Aug. 19, 1945.

¹⁹ The Soviet-Rumanian Civil Aviation Company was established by an agreement signed in Bucharest on Aug. 8, 1945. The agreement was ratified by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on Sept. 7, 1945.

Because of certain difficulties experienced by Rumania in carrying out the terms of the armistice agreement of September 12, 1944, negotiations were held in Moscow between September 4 and 11 as a result of which a series of agreements, six altogether, relating to the subsequent fulfilment of the armistice terms was signed.

According to one of the agreements the Rumanian Government was to receive in kind from the Soviet Union, a loan of 150,000 tons of wheat and 150,000 tons of maize, to be returned in kind during 1946-47, with 5 percent in kind added to it.

By a second agreement, part of the reparations deliveries of grain to the U.S.S.R. under article 11 of the armistice agreement was to be replaced by the delivery of other goods and the remaining part was to be postponed until the next harvest year. Specifically, instead of 24,000 tons of barley, 20,000 tons of wheat, and 40,000 tons of maize, which were the arrears of the first annuity (1944) and part of the second annuity (1945), oil deliveries of equivalent value were to be made; the delivery of 20,000 tons of wheat and 40,000 tons of maize, representing the balance of the second annuity, was postponed until the next harvest.

A third agreement provided for a reduction in the amounts of food grain and fodder to be supplied by Rumania for the requirements of Soviet troops in Rumania and of certain materials and Rumanian currency stipulated in article 10 of the armistice agreement.

Rumania's obligations under article 12 of the armistice agreement were the subject of a fourth agreement. By its terms the Rumanian Government admitted the removal of goods from the Soviet Union to the value of 948 billion lei—an appraisal accepted by the Soviet Government to obviate the search for removed goods (this cessation of search applies to article 7 of the armistice agreement also). It was agreed that goods to the value of 348 billion lei had already been restored to the Soviet Union by Rumania, and, in view of Rumania's participation in the war against Germany and the taking of goods by Soviet troops in occupation of Rumania, the amount of reparations owed was reduced by 300 billion lei. The remaining 300 billion lei were to be paid by instalments within three years.

²⁰ See above, n. 3.

Rumanian transportation was the subject of a fifth agreement. Soviet military control over the Rumanian railways was to be abolished and the railways returned to the control of the Rumanian Government by December 1945. A total of 15,000 cars and 115 locomotives taken as trophies was to be returned by the Soviet Union, which agreed to pay the cost of changing the trucks from Soviet broad gage to European standard gage. Captured German railway cars, 6,398 in number, were to be leased to the Rumanian Government for two years. Such tracks as had been converted to the Soviet broad gage were to be restored to the European standard gage. Further, the Soviet Government promised to lease 2,000 motor trucks to Rumania. Finally, it was agreed to return to the Rumanian Government ships taken as trophies by the Soviet forces. These numbered 18 naval vessels and 23 harbor vessels, as well as a portion of the merchant marine.

The sixth agreement provided for the repatriation of the Rumanian prisoners held by Soviet forces, 83,000 of these prisoners already being on their way home, and for the repatriation on a voluntary basis of Bessarabian and Bukovinian Soviet citizens residing in Rumania.

The two agreements political in nature relate to the restoration of diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and Rumania. On August 6, 1945 Colonel General Susaikov, Deputy Chairman of the Allied Control Commission in Rumania, announced the decision of the Soviet Government to reestablish diplomatic relations and to invite the exchange of ministers. The reply of the Rumanian Government agreed to the resumption of diplomatic relations. Later in the month an agreement was concluded between the two Governments transforming the respective legations in each country into embassies and elevating the ministers of both countries to the rank of ambassador.

Yugoslavia

In addition to the Treaty of Friendship, Mutual Aid and Post-War Cooperation of April 11, 1945²⁰ only one other agreement is known to have been concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia in 1945. This was an agreement on the mutual delivery of goods, which was signed in Moscow on April 13. The agreement provided for the

(Continued on page 423)

German Documents: Conferences With Japanese Representatives

MEMORANDUM OF THE CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE REICH FOREIGN
MINISTER AND AMBASSADOR OSHIMA AT FUSCHL, APRIL 18, 1943

AMBASSADOR OSHIMA thanked the Reich Foreign Minister for his efforts and for his support in carrying through the plans with respect to the U-boats, and he declared that the first U-boat would set sail with Admiral Nomura on board about May 10. The latter, upon his return to Tokyo, would be the person with chief responsibility for the U-boat-building program. It had been planned that four or five German engineers would travel on the first ship, which would carry a German crew. With respect to the second ship it was planned that a Japanese crew should be sent to Germany, where they would spend several weeks in making themselves familiar with all the details of navigation and other technical questions and then would themselves sail the U-boat to Japan.

The Reich Foreign Minister in his reply expressed his conviction that the U-boat arm was to be regarded as of especial importance for attaining victory. Our experience in all theaters of war had shown that success in this war depended in the first place on the proper solution of the transport question.

The maintenance of our troops in Africa, which had been a purely Italian matter, had now been taken in hand by the German Navy, and since then the situation had improved. Our Navy was also solving the supply problem in the North Sea for the maintenance of our troops in Norway as far north as Narvik, for which several million tons of shipping had been required, of which our losses, however, had amounted to only 0.3 percent, which was practically nothing. On the side of the enemy there was the same problem, only much more difficult, since all material had first to be transported across the ocean. We were hoping to torpedo this year the same amount as last, if not more. If, in addition to this total of sinkings, Japan on her

part in the Pacific and Indian Oceans could sink only 200,000 to 300,000 tons more, our enemies for this reason alone would be forced to sue for peace. The previous attitude of the Navy, that the enemy could be effectively defeated and brought to bay only by the use of large warships, was in our view obsolete. The warship was too vulnerable a unit, and at every emergence had to be accompanied by a number of other war vessels for its own defense. In the employment of the U-boat arm Japan was in even a more favorable position than Germany since she had available in the many islands a large number of bases, while our U-boat arm required the employment of the so-called "Milch Cows", or supply ships. Successful U-boat warfare was for Japan the most convenient and sure way to defend her island empire from all enemy attacks.

Ambassador Oshima stated that the Japanese Navy had now also come to this conclusion. Details about the plans which were in view could be explained by Admiral Nomura.

Passing to the general war situation the Reich Foreign Minister described how poor the Russian infantry forces were at the moment. The number of deserters was constantly increasing, and on several sectors the morale of the Russians was so bad that they planted mines in front of their positions by night, then withdrew their troops and only by day returned to their positions.

The bridgehead in Tunis we would attempt to hold at all costs, since it was of great importance

These are translations of documents on Japan, secured from German Government files, and are among the German official papers which the BULLETIN is currently publishing.

These documents have been selected and translated by J. S. Beddie, an officer in the Division of Research and Publication, Office of Public Affairs, Department of State.

for us to prevent the enemy from securing an undisturbed passage through the Mediterranean. For the landings which we expected we were prepared in every way and we were now concerned (he would speak very frankly to the Ambassador on this subject) with the question of what our allies, the Japanese armed forces, were doing and intending to do.

The Ambassador replied that, so far as he was informed, the situation in the Indian Ocean and in the Solomon Islands had improved lately. On the front in the Solomon Islands they would apparently remain rather on the defensive so as to be able to resume the offensive in the west, in the Indian Ocean, again. In Burma the Army had achieved success, and there further vigorous attacks would ensue.

The Reich Foreign Minister declared that our Three Power Pact would be truly strong and successful against the enemy only if the three allies would all together exert the greatest efforts for victory. The principal offensive force of the Americans and the English was at the moment, as he had already told the Ambassador on several occasions, being directed exclusively against Germany, who, in addition, was still having to conduct the struggle against Russia alone. If, at the time of such a vigorous assault on one of the allies, the army of the other did not take action and held back hesitantly, that was not good for the common cause. Action on the part of the Japanese could produce victory very quickly. We, of course, did not know the intentions of the Japanese Government, and we certainly had firm confidence that that Government also regarded common offensive action in the conduct of the war as the only way to victory. It had been the good fortune of the Führer that in the first years of the war he had overthrown his opponents singly and had never permitted them to conduct an attack in common. It was our duty to continue the struggle in the same manner, with all of the allies on our side moving to the attack *simultaneously* and preventing our enemies from doing the same, so that the allies of the Three Power Pact might attack them individually and dispose of them individually one after the other. Oshima agreed strongly with this point of view.

The Reich Foreign Minister then declared that he must again call the Ambassador's attention to reports about Japanese assurances to the Russians

of their continued neutrality. The fact was, however, that considerable transport trains of Siberian divisions were steadily being moved from the east to the west front, as the Chief of the General Staff, General Zeitzler, had told him again just a few days ago. He had, of course, considerable sympathy for this procedure, if by such assurances the Japanese Government was pursuing a well-defined plan. If, however, Ambassador Sato at Kuibyshev with his reassuring statements was representing the actual intentions of Tokyo, this would produce the greatest peril for our common conduct of the war. It was certain that the Russians themselves would not attack Japan, and for this reason any assurances given to Russia on the part of Japan were entirely pointless and completely contrary to our interests.

Ambassador Oshima declared that his Government had certainly never sent that sort of instructions to Kuibyshev and he could not think that Ambassador Sato would have acted on his own accord without such instructions.

The Reich Foreign Minister again declared that the present year was doubtless the most favorable opportunity for Japan, if she felt herself strong enough and possessed of sufficient anti-tank weapons, to attack Russia, who would certainly never again be as weak as she was at present.

We had reliable information according to which the Russians in the east were laying out many new airfields from which they themselves and the Americans would certainly some day attack the Japanese island empire with their bomber squadrons. The Japanese estimates of the strength of the Russians as amounting to 800,000 men in Siberia were, according to our point of view, set much too high. Our information was to the effect that there were only some 250,000 men, who, besides, were second-class troops, for all of the Siberian divisions had been defeated once already by the German armies in the past winter. If, however, Japan was not in a position to attack the Russians quickly and decisively it would be better to abstain from an attack. She should in any case, however, undertake in some other area a new attack against the English or the Americans. Ambassador Oshima declared that he did not know what the intentions of his Government were. He could, however, state that for the past 20 years all plans of the General Staff had been prepared with a view to an attack on Russia and had always been directed to such a possi-

bility. If there appeared to be any chance of success in that direction an attack would certainly be made. If Japan did not do so at the moment, however, she would certainly undertake an attack against the Anglo-Americans in the near future. The danger from that side was constantly becoming greater, because their airforce was steadily growing and for that reason had to be beaten repeatedly. The Japanese airforce for some time had been in an inferior position on the fronts, but it now had recovered from this disadvantage and was superior to the enemy. Basically, however, he could say that Japan in her whole history had never remained on the defensive in war.

The Reich Foreign Minister then gave the Ambassador information about the steady increase in deliveries from the U.S.A. to Russia. Oshima declared that he was acquainted with these reports, which could be traced back to official Japanese accounts, according to which the traffic amounted to some 50,000 tons. Unfortunately this figure in the reports to Europe had been incorrectly transmitted as 500,000 tons, a matter which the Government had already put right. If the German Government had received reports indicating that ships proceeding to Russian ports were not effectively controlled by the Japanese authorities, he would again request that this matter be taken up through Admiral Wennecker in Tokyo.

The Reich Foreign Minister declared finally that reports were circulating in various legations in the Balkans according to which Germany had prepared a memorandum on the subject of a compromise peace with Russia. Such rumors were, of course, completely untrue. We would never deal with the Russians, if only for the reason that Stalin could never accept the terms which we would have to offer him. If we were to give the Russians only a brief moment in which to catch their breath, a new war would certainly have to be fought again within five years. Even the plans for the construction of an East Wall against Russia were completely Utopian. The sole possibility of eliminating the Bolshevik danger was to weaken the power of the Russian people to the point of complete exhaustion.

Oshima said in that connection that it was known to him that the Japanese Legation in Sofia had made reports to Tokyo on the subject of rumors concerning a separate peace between Ger-

many and Russia, and he had received word of all of the telegrams on this question from Sofia and had immediately taken a stand against them.

The Reich Foreign Minister requested the Ambassador to set Tokyo right about all such untruthful rumors. Many of these rumors could unfortunately be traced back to conversations which had been carried on by the Rumanian Minister President, Mihai Antonescu. The Marshal [Ion Antonescu] on the occasion of his visit had promised to stop at once all conversations of such a sort.

The Reich Foreign Minister told the Ambassador that we were now in possession also of reliable reports about Eden's conversations in the U.S.A., according to which it was the definite intention of the English and Americans first to destroy Germany and Italy and only then to attack Japan with their united force, although the Dutch and the Australians had pressed strongly for an alteration of the Allies' war program, that is, for an immediate attack on Japan.

The Reich Foreign Minister then informed Ambassador Oshima about the reception by the Führer of the statesmen of the countries allied with Germany, which had taken place during the last few days, and he told him that there had been a conference of several days with the Duce, in which the military situation had been discussed thoroughly. All reports referring to a weakening or a hesitant attitude on the part of Italy were absolutely false. The Duce had his people firmly in hand, and he was determined to march uncompromisingly by our side to victory. In all areas where it was necessary we were furnishing the Italians support with our troops, of whom a large number were stationed on Italian home soil. In any case complete unanimity on all questions existed between the Führer and the Duce.

The same applied to Rumania, whose Chief of State, Antonescu, had also visited the Führer, by which visit we had only been confirmed in our opinion that he was a great soldier and an outstanding leader of his people. It was necessary to appraise Minister President Mihai Antonescu less favorably, as being a weaker and less determined character.

Also our old friend King Boris of Bulgaria had made a visit to the Führer. It was absolutely certain that Bulgaria would march at our side through thick and thin.

Admiral Horthy, too, had been here for an extended conference. All of the matters which affected Hungary had been cleared up definitely.

Regarding our brave allies, the Finns, the Americans some time ago had attempted to force them from our ranks and persuade them to make a separate peace. The Finnish Government had, however, given the U.S.A. an unmistakable answer, which left nothing to be desired in clarity and which amounted to a diplomatic box on the ears. Up to now this reply had not been made public, and out of regard for the Finns we had not pressed them to make it so.

The result of all of these conferences had been that every one of the allies was prepared to make the most extreme effort for the final victory and the common cause, to enter into no sort of compromise, and to fight on to the annihilation of the enemy.

The Reich Foreign Minister portrayed our own situation as follows:

Our production program was this year going off satisfactorily for the first time. Our losses in dead, wounded, and missing amounted altogether to 1,400,000, a comparatively small loss. In our production operations some 7,000,000 foreign workers had been assimilated. In addition there were occupied in industry some 5,000,000 German workers who had received military training but who had not yet fought in the war and who represented an important reserve. The Reich had made sure of its sources of raw materials. It was only necessary that Japan should supply us with rubber. The Ukraine assured our food supply. On the west massive fortifications had been constructed from the far north to the south. Our airplane-building program had for some time been in a process of reconversion. When this was completed a counter-offensive would be launched, which would wreak a fearful revenge for the air terror of our enemies on the territory of the Reich. Our defenses were being constantly improved and strengthened. The result was that of 100 enemy machines on an average only 20 would return undamaged. Of them, 80 would be damaged or shot down. On an attack on South Germany two days ago 50 machines out of 300 had been shot down, as had been admitted by the English themselves. The loss thereby in flying personnel, who represented the elite of the youth in the armed forces, was extremely heavy.

The U-boat arm on its part was steadily making further advances and achieving greater successes. For this reason alone a landing by the enemy on the European Continent was becoming ever more difficult for them. The enemy's reports of successes in this field were falsified to such an extent that no reliance could be placed on them any more and they were of significance only as demonstrating their desperate situation. Thus recently the English had reported 40 German machines shot down in Tunis, with a loss of only 2 of their own. Actually the battle had come out in our favor, with the figures almost reversed. These were typical Jewish propaganda tricks.

It was now of importance in the interest of the joint conduct of the war that Japan also should destroy a corresponding amount of the enemy's forces. For the moment was coming when in America ever greater internal unrest would break out because the people did not understand the purpose of the war. The simple American soldier did not know what he was fighting for and he did not understand the aims of his plutocratic and imperialistic leadership. The harder and the more quickly we attacked, the sooner such internal difficulties would occur in the U.S.A.

Ambassador Oshima declared that his government certainly intended to resume the offensive this year, for he was sure that it was understood in Tokyo that the establishment of the Greater East Asian Empire could only come about through the most earnest efforts on their own part.

The Ambassador then gave the Reich Foreign Minister an account of the trip of two members of the Japanese Embassy in Kuibyshev who had recently had the opportunity to make an extensive journey in Russia. He stated that, of course, only the things which were favorable had been shown to the two Japanese and that their account should be considered as of slight value because of its propaganda character. He wanted, however, to refer to the propaganda themes of the Russians, set forth in the final paragraph, which showed the necessity of a corresponding counter-propaganda on the German side. He was convinced that agitation aimed at disunity in Russia, which, as was well known, consisted of a number of widely differing peoples, would have great success and was absolutely necessary. The Ambassador referred in this connection to the successes which Japan had achieved in Burma through her

declaration of Burmese independence, which had had a very powerful effect on India and the other neighboring peoples.

The Reich Foreign Minister declared in conclusion that his motto for the conduct of the war by the allies was: A speedy victory lies in taking the offensive.

The sinews of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo triangle must be kept taut and each of them must exert his utmost effort, whereby Japan on her part this year must pass over to the attack on a large scale.

In connection with this conversation the Reich Foreign Minister, with Ambassador Oshima present, received Admiral Nomura, who came to say farewell. Admiral Nomura thanked the Reich Foreign Minister for the friendly reception which he had received during the time of his visit in Germany, the trusting collaboration, the great understanding, and the constant assistance which the Reich Foreign Minister had given the Japanese in all questions affecting the Navy.

The Reich Foreign Minister also spoke to Admiral Nomura about the transport problem in this war, about our experience in this connection in Africa, about the difficulties of the enemy in maintaining their supply lines, and about the possibilities which were open to us in that connection.

Admiral Nomura declared that he had discussed at length with Admiral Fricke and other officers of the Naval Staff, and also with General Jodl, the U-boat question and the war on shipping. In the Japanese Navy up to now the prevailing idea had been that of the strategic protection of East Asia waters. In this connection in October of last year there had been worked out completely a plan for a large-scale naval operation in the Indian Ocean. The American attack on the Solomon Islands had thwarted this plan. In that area and in particular at Guadalcanal very severe battles had taken place, since the Americans had been successful in establishing strong air bases. Fighting had been carried on there for five months, in which the Japanese Navy had achieved great successes and the Japanese had also on their part been able to construct air bases. At the beginning of this year the situation on that front could be regarded as assured. In connection with this fighting it had become apparent also to the Japanese Navy that the cutting of the enemy lines of communication was to be regarded as of the greatest importance,

and accordingly the view taken of the employment of the U-boat arm had been altered. Almost simultaneously there were being held these conversations between the Reich Foreign Minister and Ambassador Oshima concerning the necessity of a war on shipping being conducted also by Japan, after which had come the Führer's offer of a transfer of U-boats to serve as models for the Japanese Navy. This fortunate coincidence had resulted in the immediate commencement of a U-boat-building program in Japan.

The Reich Foreign Minister also explained to the Admiral the viewpoint of the Führer, who believed that the large battleship in its present form was a vulnerable object, which always had to be surrounded by a swarm of protecting ships for its own defense. Also the American Navy had not offered a large-scale sea battle. An extensive U-boat arm was the best defense for Japan and the surest means of quickly winning the war.

Nomura replied that this change in opinion had been needed in the Japanese Navy, which previously had been interested only in sinking as large as possible a number of enemy warships. Now the Japanese Navy would employ all of its forces, cruisers, torpedo planes, and the U-boat arm in destroying enemy shipping. They had already sunk over 100,000 tons in half a month. Only recently a group of submarines had again departed for operations off the Persian Gulf.

To a question from the Reich Foreign Minister regarding the length of time required for construction the Admiral replied that the Japanese Navy at the moment had some 50 submarines. The German model for the new mass production would probably arrive in Japan at the end of July. All of the plans and preparations for construction would have already been taken care of, so that building could be begun before the end of this year. The new U-boats, which would be produced in order, would then likely be ready for operations by the end of the year 1944.

The Reich Foreign Minister referred in this connection to the situation of our enemies in 1917, about which the English leader of that date, Lloyd George, had told him on the occasion of his visit to Germany in 1936. At that time the shipping position of the English had become so serious that he was confronted almost daily with the

(Continued on page 427)

The United Nations

Report on Work of Economic and Social Council

[Released to the press August 25]

Acting Secretary Acheson released on August 25 the text of the report by John G. Winant to the Secretary of State on the work of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, on which he is the United States representative.¹

In his covering letter,² Mr. Winant points out that the work already done should make it possible for the Council, its Commissions, and its related agencies to concert their efforts, before the end of this year, toward the attainment of the economic and social objectives of the United Nations Charter. He believes that the Council has gotten off to a good start by taking up first things first and by demonstrating the ability of its 18 members to reach forward-looking decisions through the process of negotiation, compromise, and working together in a spirit of patience and understanding.

The report covers, from the point of view of the United States, the work of the Council from its formation in London through its second session in New York ending June 21. It deals with the progress made in regard to such important matters as the World Health Organization, the problem of refugees and displaced persons, and the proposed International Refugee Organization, the relations with specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations, and the various commissions of the Council.

Mr. Winant calls attention in his covering letter and in the report to the urgent problem of the network of trade barriers which restricts world trade and employment; to the establishment by the Council of a Preparatory Committee for an International Conference on Trade and Employ-

ment; and to the announcement of the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the proposed plan to hold the first meeting of this Committee in London on October 15 of this year.

The report also mentions a number of items to be taken up at the third session of the Economic and Social Council starting September 11, including: further consideration of the draft constitution of the proposed International Refugee Organization; review of the report of the Temporary Subcommission on Economic Reconstruction of Devastated Areas; establishment with full memberships of the Commission on Human Rights, the Social Commission, the Economic and Employment Commission, the Transport and Communications Commission, the Statistical Commission, and the Commission on the Status of Women; consideration of the establishment of a Fiscal Commission, a Demographic Commission, and a commission or committee for the purpose of coordinating the work of the specialized agencies; and consideration of the report to be made by the Secretary-General of the United Nations on assistance rendered to the Director-General of the Food and Agriculture Organization in making the survey concerning longer-term international machinery with reference to food.

The main headings of the report, which is summarized in Mr. Winant's letter to Secretary Byrnes, are as follows:

1. First Session of the Economic and Social Council
2. World Health Problems
3. Refugees and Displaced Persons
4. The Specialized Agencies
5. The Non-Governmental Organizations
6. The Reports of the Commissions
7. Looking to the Future

(Continued on next page)

¹ Report will be published by the Department of State in the near future.

² Printed in BULLETIN of Aug. 18, 1946, p. 322.

Provisional Agenda for Third Session of Economic and Social Council

[Released to the press by UN August 12]

1. Adoption of agenda.¹
2. International Refugee Organization, including review of comments of members on draft constitution (doc. E/92); report of the Committee on Finances (doc. E/Ref.Fin./23); and preliminary report of the Secretary-General on plans for interim measures.
3. Preliminary report of the Temporary Subcommission on Economic Reconstruction of Devastated Areas.
4. Report of Comitée on Negotiations with Specialized Agencies.
5. Election of members of commissions.
6. Report of the Secretary-General called for by the Resolution on Assistance to the Food and Agriculture Organization.
7. Request to the General Assembly for authorization to the Council to request advisory opinions of the International Court of Justice.
8. Transfer to the United Nations of functions and powers previously exercised by the League of Nations under the International Narcotics Conventions of January 23, 1912, February 19, 1925, July 12, 1931, and June 26, 1936.
9. Report of the Secretary-General on the International Health Conference.
10. Transfer to the United Nations of non-political functions and activities of the League of Nations not covered under items 8 and 9.
11. Report of the Committee on Arrangements for Consultation with Nongovernmental Organizations.
12. Report of the Committee on the Organization of the Council on the Fiscal Commission (doc. E/20).

¹ For supplementary notes on the agenda, refer to *United Nations Weekly Bulletin* of Aug. 19, 1946, p. 6.

13. Report of the Committee on the Organization of the Council on the Demographic Commission (doc. E/20).

14. Report of the Committee on the Organization of the Council on the Coordination Commission (doc. E/20).

15. United Kingdom proposal concerning the question of the assumption by the United Nations of the functions and powers connected with public loans issued with the assistance of the League of Nations (doc. E/49).

16. Belgian proposal concerning the League of Red Cross Societies (doc. E/47).

17. Consideration of arrangements for conferring respectively with representatives of the Security Council and of the Trusteeship Council concerning the methods of cooperation with each of these bodies in dealing with matters of common concern.

18. Terms of reference of the subcommissions of the Economic and Employment Commission.

19. United Kingdom proposal concerning the composition of subcommissions of the Economic and Employment Commission (doc. E/JC/W.1.).

20. Payment of expenses of members of commissions.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COUNCIL—*Con. from page 404.*

There are, in addition, four appendixes: the first gives a list of the Council's committees and commissions and their members; the second lists the delegates and advisers of the 18 members for the second session; the third gives the schedule of meetings at the second session; and the fourth lists documents relating to the work of the Council.

A limited number of copies of the report are available.

International Organizations and Conferences

Calendar of Meetings¹

Far Eastern Commission	Washington	February 26
Peace Conference	Paris	July 29
Fourth General Assembly of the Pan American Institute of Geography and History and Third Pan American Consultation on Cartography	Caracas	August 25-September 1
Eleventh International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art	Venice	August 31-September 15
Fifth Congress of the Postal Union of the Americas and Spain	Rio de Janeiro	September 1
First Inter-American Medical Congress	Rio de Janeiro	September 7-15
The United Nations:		
Security Council	New York	March 25
Military Staff Committee	New York	March 25
Commission on Atomic Energy	New York	June 14
Subcommission on the Reconstruction of Devastated Areas ²	London	July 29
UNESCO: Executive Committee	London	August 19-21
PICAO: Caribbean Regional Air Navigation Meeting	Washington	August 26
ILO: Permanent Migration Committee	Montreal	August 26
FAO: Annual Session	Copenhagen	September 2-14
Economic and Social Council (Third Session) with Commissions and Subcommissions	New York	September 11
Committee for Arrangements for Consultation with Non-Governmental Organizations	New York	September 6 or 7
General Assembly: Second Part of First Session	New York	September 23

¹ The opening dates in the third column are current as of Aug. 25.

² Field teams in various parts of Europe.

Activities and Developments

PICAO: Caribbean Regional Air Navigation Meeting.¹ Virtually all the members of foreign delegations planning to attend the Caribbean Regional Air Navigation Meeting of PICAO (Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization), which opens in Washington on August 26 at the Pan American Union, had arrived here over the week-end.

In addition to the United States Delegation, which numbers members from various agencies of this Government and from private organiza-

tions, large delegations will represent the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Canada, and France. Of the remaining 21 nations which will be represented officially there are 16 American nations, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. In addition, both Australia and Czechoslovakia will be represented by observers, while it is possible also that China will send an observer.

Thus, although the meeting has been designated as pertaining primarily to the Caribbean, the par-

¹ Released to the press by the Caribbean Commission Aug. 26.

icipation of various nations lying outside of the area gives to it a truly global character. In terms of hemispheric aviation the Caribbean area to be discussed extends broadly from New Orleans on the north to the Amazon River on the south, including the entire Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, and northern South America.

Walter Percy, of the Civil Aeronautics Administration, who will serve as Secretary General, will make introductory remarks on behalf of PICAQ. Mr. Percy will introduce Charles I. Stanton, Deputy Administrator of the CAA and internationally known aviation expert, who will serve as temporary president. The address of welcome on behalf of this Government will be delivered by William A. M. Burden, Assistant Secretary of Commerce. The response on behalf of PICAQ will be made by Edward Warner, former Vice Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board and now President of the Interim Council of PICAQ, which maintains its provisional headquarters in Montreal. Then will follow the election of the permanent president, the election of the chairman and two vice chairmen of the General Committee, and the organization of the seven committees to handle the major work of the gathering. These committees, all of which will hold their opening meetings on August 27, pertain to air-traffic control; telecommunications and radio aids to navigation; meteorology for protection of civil aviation; aerodromes, air routes, and ground aids; search and rescue; flight operations; and preparation of a regional manual for general distribution.

Aside from the opening and closing sessions to be held at the Pan American Union, all other open and committee meetings will be held in the Department of State conference building, 1778 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW. The Department's Division of International Conferences has been established in this building, and an assembly room with a seating capacity of several hundred persons has been constructed on the top floor in readiness for initial use on this occasion.

Between 200 and 250 persons are expected to be in attendance at this Conference, which is scheduled to run for about three weeks. In honor of the various distinguished civilian, military, and naval aviation figures in attendance, a number of social events have been planned. The first such event will be a reception to be given at the Mayflower Hotel late on the afternoon of August 26 by Wil-

liam L. Clayton, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.

U.S. DELEGATION

Chairman:

Charles I. Stanton, Deputy Administrator, Civil Aeronautics Administration

Alternate Delegate and Vice Chairman:

Glen A. Gilbert, Consultant to the Administrator, Civil Aeronautics Administration

Chief Technical Adviser:

Robert D. Hoyt, Coordinator of International Regulations, Civil Aeronautics Board

Alternate Chief Technical Adviser:

Jesse K. Fenno, Assistant Coordinator of International Regulations, Civil Aeronautics Board

Technical Secretary:

Col. Lawrence M. Thomas, Air Transport Command, Army Air Forces

Technical Advisers, Heads of Present U.S. Technical Teams:

Air Traffic Control: Clifford P. Burton, Assistant Chief, Air Traffic Control Division, Office of Federal Airways, Civil Aeronautics Administration

Aerodromes, Air Routes and Ground Aids: James F. Angier, Airways Engineer, Office of Federal Airways, Civil Aeronautics Board

Communications: L. Ross Hayes, Assistant Chief, Communications Division, Office of Federal Airways, Civil Aeronautics Administration

Meteorology: Delbert M. Little, Assistant Chief of Bureau, U.S. Weather Bureau

Search and Rescue: Commander W. B. Scheibel, Executive Assistant to the Head, Air-Sea Rescue Agency, U.S. Coast Guard

Operations: Ray F. Nicholson, Chief, Air Carrier Branch, Second Region, Civil Aeronautics Administration

Additional Technical Advisers:

Col. Carl Swyter, Office of Air Communications Officer, Headquarters, Army Air Forces

Capt. A. S. Heyward, Jr., Coordinator for PICAQ Matters, PICAQ Section of Civil Air Agencies Sec., Office of Deputy Chief Naval Operations (Air), Navy Department

Edwin L. White, Head Radio Engineer, Chief of Aviation Division, Federal Communications Division

Arthur L. Lebel, Chief, Aviation Communications Section, Aviation Division, Department of State

Alan Osbourne, Chief of Research, Technical Division, Maritime Commission

Donald W. Nyrop, Official PICAQ Representative for Air Transport Association

Reeder G. Nichols, Assistant to the President, Aeronautical Radio, Inc.

The First Inter-American Medical Congress¹ is scheduled to meet at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, from September 7 to 15, 1946. It is being held by the National Academy of Medicine under the auspices of the Brazilian Government.

According to the announcement received from the Brazilian organizing committee, the work of the Congress is to be divided into sections as follows: "(1) hospital assistance and organization; (2) continental immigratory policies as to the medical and racial aspects; (3) war medicine and surgery; (4) cancer prevention and therapeutics; (5) the great endemics; (6) nutrology and vitaminology; (7) endocrinology; (8) tuberculosis; (9) neuro-psychiatry; (10) hygiene, public health, and continental sanitary legislation; (11) surgical themes; (12) medical themes; and (13) themes of free choice."

A commission of Brazilian physicians visited the United States in the spring for the purpose of contacting various United States medical organizations and medical men and inviting them to be represented at the Congress. The Academy hopes to assemble a large and representative group of the medical men of this continent for the Congress.

Recommendations have been received by the Department of State favoring United States representation at the Congress, and delegates are expected to be present from the War and Navy Departments, Veterans Administration, and Public Health Service.

¹ Prepared by the Division of International Conferences, Department of State.

Eleventh International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art.¹ The United States Government was invited by the Italian Embassy at Washington to participate in the Eleventh International Exhibition of Cinematographic Art in Venice from August 31 to September 15, 1946.

The purpose of the Exhibition is to present motion pictures to the public that will show the progress made by the motion-picture industry as a means of expression in the artistic, cultural, scientific, and educational fields. Each participating nation is unrestricted in its choice of films, but all films exhibited shall be first showings in Italy. A commission of motion-picture critics will select seven feature films, including at least one Italian film, which it deems deserving of special mention under various headings to be established by the commission. A similar selection may also be made for documentary films.

The motion-picture industry of the United States has made plans to participate in the Exhibition, and arrangements are being made by the representatives of the leading United States companies. Several United States documentary films will be shown in conjunction with the films furnished by the industry.

Air-Transport Agreement With Lebanon

An air-transport agreement between the United States and Lebanon was signed at Beirut on August 11, 1946, with Minister George Wadsworth signing on behalf of this Government. For text of the agreement see Department of State press release 567 of August 13.

The Record of the Week

Protest Against Yugoslav Obstruction to Allied Military Government

[Released to the press August 19]

Text of a note delivered by the American Chargé d'Affaires at Belgrade, Harold Shantz, to the Yugoslav Foreign Office on May 20, 1946, in reply to a Yugoslav note of March 27, 1946, protesting the Allied administration of Venezia Giulia

I have the honor to inform Your Excellency¹ that I have been instructed by my Government to transmit to you the following communication:

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom² have taken note of the Yugoslav Government's communication of March 27, 1946, which is but last in a series of unwarranted protests by the Yugoslav Government, which have at the same time been accompanied by an anti-Allied propaganda campaign recently culminating in a wholly unfounded charge by Marshal Tito in his speech of April 1, 1946, that twelve trains and seventy trucks full of armed fascists were brought into Zone A with the approval of the Allied authorities.

As the Yugoslav Government is well aware, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom are jointly responsible for the maintenance of the Allied Military Government in Zone A until the future disposal of the territory is decided.³ They have endeavored to govern the area in a spirit of trusteeship in such a way as to ensure equal treatment for all inhabitants without distinction of race or political adherence. To this end, they have established a democratic system of administration based upon the Italian prefectorial system purged of all measures inspired by fascist ideology. They have allowed the Yugoslav system of local government by committee, which was imposed by the Yugoslav army during its occupation of the area, to remain in existence despite refusal of such committees from the outset

to cooperate with the Allied Military Government, or to participate in the administration established under General Order no. 11. They have established a civil police, members of which have been carefully examined to prevent inclusion of individuals with pro-fascist sympathies or tendencies, and this police force has shown courage and patience in the face of provocation and slander. They have re-established Slovene schools suppressed by the Mussolini Government and have taken pains to ensure provision of liberal education free of ideological prejudice to both Italian and Slovene children.

As promised in their notes of September 17 and 19 last, the United States and the United Kingdom have proceeded with arrangements to hold local elections in Venezia Giulia, and electoral lists are at present in the course of preparation. Finally, they have allowed access to Zone A by representatives of all nations and have permitted the Yugoslav Government to maintain a force of 2,000 men in the area, whereas no facilities remotely comparable have been given for inspection by other interested parties of the administration which the Yugoslav Government has set up in Zone B.

In spite of sincere efforts to ensure impartiality

¹ Stanoje Simic, Minister of Foreign Affairs.

² The note presented by the British Chargé d'Affaires, George Clutton, at the same time was identical except for the opening and closing sentences and for minor changes in wording and spelling occasioned by language differences.

³ For text of agreement between the U. S., British, and Yugoslav Governments, see BULLETIN of June 10, 1945, p. 1050. For letter from the Yugoslav Foreign Minister to the American Ambassador on signing of Agreement on Military Occupation and Administration of Venezia Giulia, see BULLETIN of June 17, 1945, p. 1096.

and in spite of the known fact that the Allied Military Government will remain only until the decision about the future sovereignty of the territory has been ratified, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom regret to say that they have not received from the Yugoslav Government that cooperation in their tasks which they had a right to expect from an Ally. On the contrary, the Yugoslav Government has, by every means in its power, and in particular by a provocative campaign in the press and over the radio, encouraged the pro-Yugoslav population in Trieste and throughout Zone A, both Slovene and Italian, to obstruct the Allied Military Government in the performance of its duties, to promote industrial discontent, to hinder the educational program, and to intimidate those inhabitants of the area who are not in favor of its incorporation into Yugoslavia.

In support of the foregoing, I am instructed to mention the following provocative Yugoslav actions and to emphasize that this list is by no means complete:

1. *Subornation of press:* Pro-Slav propagandists in Zone A have on more than one occasion openly acknowledged their subservience to Ljubljana and Belgrade in such matters as allocation of newsprint and release of articles on local events.

2. *Attempts to discredit public order forces:* Investigation of accusation by P.N.O.O. (National Liberation Committee of the Slovene Littoral) and the pro-Slav press that 38 armed members of police were fascists disclosed only six doubtful cases, of which three may lead to dismissal. Thirteen cases did not exist.

3. *Propaganda attacks against the Allied Military Government:* False and inflammatory statements by the pro-Slav newspaper "Lavoratore" in one instance led to the fining and conviction of the Director by the Allied Military Government court on March 29, 1946.

4. *Incitement to unrest:* Yugoslav authorities have brought into Zone A armed pro-Slav groups from Zone B for pro-Slav demonstrations, such as those at Gorizia on March 2 and 27, 1946, and at Trieste on March 26, 1946. A resident of Zone B who was arrested in Trieste on March 26 for carrying firearms made a voluntary signed statement that he and two others had been given arms

by Zone B authorities and sent across the Morgan Line to demonstrate. Other residents of Zone B arrested in Trieste have stated that they were warned to participate in demonstrations and were furnished motor transport as far as the Morgan Line. Six shiploads of demonstrators from Zone B were brought to Trieste on April 2, 1946, despite specific assurance that no persons from Zone B would participate.

5. *Intimidation of the local population:* On March 10, 1946, a known extremist action squad leader, with ten men, left P.N.O.O. headquarters in Trieste and went to Servola where he directed a demonstration. During the general strike in Trieste on March 11, 1946, action squads wearing a red star compelled shopkeepers to close their shops. On numerous occasions action squads from communist cultural clubs have beaten up pro-Italians; one such club was raided on March 30, 1946, and arms were found, leading to the arrest of 25 persons.

6. *Intimidation of local officials:* Nine specific cases have been reported in which members of civil police have received threats to themselves or their families in Zone B in an attempt to induce them to leave the force or act as pro-Slav agents. On March 14, 1946, a delegation representing 42 Slovene teachers requested Allied Military Government protection as they were constantly being threatened by pro-Yugoslav elements and feared abduction, and felt that they must resign from their schools unless assured of Allied Military Government protection.

7. *Fomenting industrial unrest and impeding production:* Political strikes and work stoppages fomented by a pro-Slav organization have occurred in Zone A this year on January 25, 26, 29, 30, February 16, March 11, 12, 26, and April 1. Sindicati Unici constantly hold political meetings in industrial plants during working hours. On January 8, Radich, Sindicati Unici leader, called a meeting in Fabbrica Lacchipe in violation of express Allied Military Government orders, and was arrested therefor. Pro-Slav elements in shipyards have misappropriated large quantities of paints and other materials for propaganda use.

8. *Usurping functions of the government:* The Allied Military Government on April 23, 1946, was finally compelled to give public warning that persons and organizations attempting to usurp

the powers of government, and persons obeying orders issued in such attempts, would be prosecuted. At Sesana, P.N.O.O. had on March 20, 1946, issued orders to teachers in three Slovene communes to send pupils to work on reforestation during school hours. Other instances of P.N.O.O. attempts to usurp government authority include collections of taxes and excise, appointment of school inspectors and of courts to settle land disputes, and interference with educational, agricultural, public works and reconstruction policies, including reconstruction of damaged Slovene villages. The action committee which superseded the strike committee directing the strike on March 11 and 12 was dissolved by the Allied Military Government for also attempting to usurp government functions.

9. *Criminal and terrorist activities:* Members of the Yugoslav army and para-military organizations such as KNOJ and OZNA have been arrested while abducting civilians and engaged in other criminal acts. Four of these have volunteered signed statements that they were sent on their missions by their superiors in Yugoslavia and Zone B.

As will be evident from the above instances, the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have been forced to conclude that the provocative activities of the P.N.O.O. and other pro-Yugoslav organizations have been encouraged and directed by Yugoslav officials from within Yugoslavia. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom request to be informed at the earliest opportunity whether such officials acted with the knowledge and authority of the Yugoslav Government and precisely what relations the Yugoslav Government considers to exist between itself and the P.N.O.O. and similar organizations in Zone A.

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have shown themselves fully prepared to examine all justified complaints of the Yugoslav Government as, for example, complaints of unauthorized flights over Yugoslav territory which, although greatly exaggerated, have been shown to possess some foundation. They have shown themselves equally ready to take all necessary steps to remove the grounds for such complaints as is shown by the fact that strict instructions have been given to avoid any further unauthorized flights over Yugoslavia and Zone B, and

that in accordance with the Yugoslav Government's request, measures have been taken to round up any members of the Ustasha movement and other Yugoslav quislings who might be at large in Zone A. They are forced, however, to conclude from the manner in which such complaints have been made public that they are part of a concerted campaign in which the most trivial incident is used in an attempt to discredit the Allied Military Government in Zone A. The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom have, for example, noted with regret that His Excellency Marshal Tito is reported in a speech on April 1, 1946, to have described the unauthorized flights over Zone B as a danger to peace and that the Yugoslav Minister of Information is similarly reported to have referred at a press conference to the possibility of raising the matter before the Security Council of the United Nations Organization. Reference to such a possibility appears unnecessary and indeed frivolous in view of the fact that the matter is under discussion through ordinary diplomatic channels.

The Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom earnestly trust that they will in the future receive from the Yugoslav Government the cooperation they are entitled to expect in their task of administering Zone A in a fair and impartial manner until its disposal is finally decided. They wish, however, to make it clear that despite all difficulties placed in their way by the Slovene population with official Yugoslav encouragement, they propose to continue such fair and impartial administration upon the lines laid down by the Allied Military Government until the task which they have undertaken is completed.

Agriculture in the Americas

The following article of interest to readers of the BULLETIN appeared in the September issue of *Agriculture in the Americas*, a publication of the Department of Agriculture, copies of which may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, for 10 cents each:

"Acacia Negra Industry in Rio Grande do Sul", by Joseph L. Dougherty, agricultural analyst, American Consulate, Porto Alegre, Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil.

General Order on Government of Venezia Giulia¹

WHEREAS it is desirable to establish a uniform system of local government in those parts of the Territory of VENEZIA GIULIA occupied by Allied Troops (hereinafter referred to as the Occupied Territory).

NOW, THEREFORE, I ALFRED C. BOWMAN, Colonel J. A. G. D., Senior Civil Affairs Officer, hereby order as follows:

SECTION 1

ORGAN OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

1.—The occupied Territory, for purposes of local Government, is divided into the Areas of TRIESTE and GORIZIA and into the Commune of POLA, each of which shall be composed of the Communes and fractions thereof as presently constituted.

2.—Each Area shall have an Area President and Area Council with the powers, functions and duties hereinafter specified.

3.—Each Commune shall have a Communal President and Communal Council with the powers, functions and duties hereinafter specified.

4.—Each Area and Commune shall have such administrative and executive departments and agencies as the Allied Military Government may determine and deem necessary for the proper carrying out of the functions of local government.

SECTION 2

AREA PRESIDENT

1.—The Area President shall be appointed and be removable by the Allied Military Government.

2.—He shall be directly responsible to the ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT for the local government of the Area and shall submit all orders and decrees for its prior approval.

3.—He shall be the executive and administrative head of the Area local government and shall be subject to the provisions of this General Order and all further orders which may hereafter be made by the Allied Military Government and shall

possess, in the aggregate, such powers and duties of a Prefect of a Province and of such Provincial and Prefectural legislative, administrative and executive bodies as are conferred by the Occupied Territory in effect on 8 Sept. 1943 and by any Proclamation or other order of the Allied Military Government of the Occupied Territory which may change or supersede such laws.

SECTION 3

AREA ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENTS

1.—The Allied Military Government shall establish such departments, divisions or agencies in the Area President's Office as may be necessary for the proper local government of the Area.

2.—The Staff of such departments, divisions, or agencies shall be appointed and be removable by the Allied Military Government. The President shall be assisted by a Vice President who shall be appointed and be removable by the Allied Military Government.

3.—The President may, subject to the approval of the Military Government, delegate to the Vice President and other officials of his office special duties in connection with the local government of his Area and of the Communes therein situated.

SECTION 4

AREA COUNCIL

1.—An Area Council shall be composed of a Chairman plus the following number of members for each of the Areas specified:

Area of Trieste—17 Members

Area of Gorizia—14 Members

all of whom shall be appointed and be removable by the Allied Military Government.

2.—Consideration shall be given to the selection of the Chairman and Members from the leading citizens of the Area of the highest moral and political probity who shall be, as far as possible, representative of all racial, political and economic groups and classes in the Area according to their respective local strength.

3.—Substitute or alternate members may be appointed and be removable by the Allied Military

¹ General Order No. 11, printed from *The Allied Military Government Gazette*, No. 1, September 15, 1945 [Allied Military Government, 13 Corps, Venezia Giulia], published by the Allied Military Government under the authority of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater of Operations, and Military Governor.

Government but shall not take part in any proceedings except in the absence of regular members.

4.—An Area Council shall meet at least once every week and at such other time as it may be convened by the Area President with the approval of the Allied Military Government.

5.—It may adopt rules of procedure which shall be submitted to the Allied Military Government for its approval or otherwise.

6.—An Area Council shall act as an advisory and consultative body to the Area President in all matters concerning the local government of the Area referred to it by the Area President.

7.—The decision of an Area Council on all matters laid before it for advice and opinion shall be taken by a majority vote and shall be made part of the minutes of the meeting.

8.—An exact transcript of such minutes shall be transmitted by the Chairman of the Council to the Area President and by the latter to the Area Commissioner of the Allied Military Government within two days after the meeting to which it relates.

SECTION 5

HEADS OF THE COMMUNAL GOVERNMENT

1.—The Head of a Commune shall be styled Communal President.

2.—He shall be appointed and be removable by the Allied Military Government.

3.—He shall possess in his Commune, in the aggregate, such powers and duties of a Mayor of a Commune and of such Communal administrative, legislative and executive bodies as are conferred by the laws referred to in Section 2, sub-section (3) hereof, and shall be subject to such supervision and control by the Area President as may be provided by the said laws. The Communal President of the Commune of Pola shall, in addition to his other powers, possess all of the powers and duties of an Area President as specified in sub-section (3) of Section 2 of this General Order.

SECTION 6

COMMUNAL ADMINISTRATIVE DEPARTMENTS

1.—The Allied Military Government shall establish such departments, divisions or agencies in the Office of the Communal President as may be necessary for the proper local government of the Commune.

2.—The Staff of such departments, divisions or

agencies shall be appointed and be removable by the Allied Military Government.

3.—The Communal President may, subject to the approval of Allied Military Government, delegate to officials in his office special duties in connection with the local government of his Commune.

4.—A Communal Secretary may be appointed by the laws referred by the Allied Military Government where it is deemed necessary so to do and he shall possess such special powers as are conferred by the laws referred to in Section 2, Sub-section (3) hereof.

SECTION 7

COMMUNAL COUNCIL

1.—Each Commune, including the Commune of POLA, shall have a Communal Council composed of a Chairman plus membership which shall be numerically fixed in accordance with the provisions following:

POPULATION	MEMBERS
250,000 or over	12
over 30,000	8
Other Communes	4

all of whom shall be appointed and be removable by the Allied Military Government.

2.—Consideration shall be given to the selection of the Chairman and Members from the leading citizens of the Commune of the highest moral and political probity who shall be, as far as possible, representative of all racial, political and economic groups and classes in the Commune according to their respective local strength.

3.—Substitute or alternate members may be appointed and be removable by the Allied Military Government but shall not take part in any proceedings except in the absence of the regular members.

4.—The Communal Council shall meet at least once every week and at such other times as it may be convened by the Communal President with the approval of the Allied Military Government.

5.—It may adopt rules of procedure which shall be submitted to the Allied Military Government for its approval or otherwise.

6.—A Communal Council shall act as an advisory and consultative body to the Communal President in all matters concerning the local government of the Commune referred to it by the Communal President.

7.—The decisions of a Communal Council on all matters laid before it for advice and opinion shall be taken by a majority vote and shall be made part of the minutes of the meeting.

8.—An exact transcript of the minutes shall be transmitted to the Communal President and by the latter to the Area President who shall in turn transmit it to the Area Commissioner of the Allied Military Government within seven days after the meeting to which it relates.

SECTION 8

COMBINATION OF COMMUNES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT PURPOSES

Whenever and wherever and to the extent to which it is deemed necessary or desirable to do so the Allied Military Government may provide for the local government of two or more Communes by one official or administrative organ established for and in any named Commune.

SECTION 9

POWERS TO FORM A DISTRICT COMMITTEE

1.—Whenever and wherever and to the extent it is deemed desirable or necessary to do so an Area Commissioner is hereby empowered to form, by order in writing under his hand, an advisory body from two or more Communes which for this purpose only shall be styled a District. Such body may be known as a District Committee.

2.—The Chairman and members of each District Committee shall be chosen from among leading citizens of the Communes forming each District.

3.—The District Committee shall have no executive or legislative control over the Communal President or Communal Council of their respective Communes.

SECTION 10

OTHER COMMITTEES

No committee, council or group other than those herein created and provided for, except those previously constituted by a Proclamation or Order of the Allied Military Government, shall possess any of the administrative, legislative, executive or other powers of government.

SECTION 11

CONTROL OF ALLIED MILITARY GOVERNMENT

1.—Allied Military Government is the only government in those parts of Venezia Giulia occupied

by the Allied Forces and is the only authority empowered to issue orders and decrees and to make appointment to public or other office.

All of the local government bodies created by and referred to in this order shall at all times be under the direct control and supervision of the Allied Military Government.

2.—The Chairman and Members of the Area and Communal Councils and District Committees shall be unpaid. Salaries of all other officials shall be determined by the Allied Military Government.

SECTION 12

EFFECTIVE DATE

This General Order shall become operative in each Area or part thereof within the occupied territory on the date of its first publication therein.

Dated in TRIESTE this 11th day of August 1945.

ALFRED C. BOWMAN

Colonel J. A. G. D.

Senior Civil Affairs Officer

Protest Against Entry of Yugoslav Forces Into Zone A

[Released to the press August 19]

Text of note delivered by the Chargé d'Affaires of the American Embassy at Belgrade, Harold Shantz, to the Yugoslav Foreign Office, on August 15

This Government emphatically rejects the Yugoslav protest of July 16, which is apparently based upon distortion of evidence available to Yugoslav as well as United States military authorities regarding the incident of July 12.

The facts of the incident are as follows: At 6:00 p.m. on July 12 in the area of Ursina, 5.2 kilometers east southeast of Caporetto, three Yugoslav soldiers were seen in Zone A and a United States patrol was sent to investigate. This United States patrol was fired upon by Yugoslavs and the fire was returned. One Yugoslav soldier was killed. A second United States patrol of platoon strength was sent out and a Yugoslav patrol of 10 to 15 men was encountered. Once again the Yugoslavs opened fire, which was again re-

turned by the United States patrol. It was not known at this time that there was any casualty among the Yugoslav forces, who withdrew.

The point at which the first Yugoslav patrol was encountered is some 900 yards northeast of Ursina and is about 300 yards within Zone A. Neither of the United States patrols therefore crossed the Morgan Line.

On the morning of July 13 a Yugoslav machine gun post was discovered to have been set up near the point where the second Yugoslav patrol had been seen the previous day, but this post was later withdrawn. Subsequently, the incidents were settled between the United States and Yugoslav local commanders, at which time the Yugoslav Commander stated that a second soldier had also been killed.

This Government naturally regrets Yugoslav losses in the above-mentioned encounters, but must at the same time make it clear that United States forces began firing in self defense only after Yugoslav forces had first opened fire. The Yugoslav

Government must also be aware that in addition to the unwarranted entry of Yugoslav forces into the Zone cited above, 12 Yugoslav soldiers crossed the Morgan Line on June 19 and entered the village of Prebenico, and that on June 30 a British patrol in the same village was surrounded by 25 armed Yugoslavs under the command of a sergeant major who stated that his instructions were to set up a post in Prebenico, and who confirmed by telephone, presumably with a higher Yugoslav command, that such were his orders. This Yugoslav patrol was only recently withdrawn from Prebenico, although there could have been no doubt that it was well to the west of the Morgan Line.

This Government must, therefore, protest in strongest terms the unwarranted entry of Yugoslav forces into Zone A, the hostile attitude shown by Yugoslav troops at Prebenico towards British troops of Allied forces in Venezia Giulia, and the opening of fire without provocation by Yugoslav forces against United States troops.

Protest Against Yugoslav Attack on American Plane and Detention of American Personnel

NOTE TO YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT

[Released to the press August 20]

The American Ambassador in Belgrade, Richard C. Patterson, has been instructed to deliver to the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs a note along the following lines:

Reference is made to previous representations with regard to alleged violations of Yugoslav territory by United States aircraft and the forcing to the ground by Yugoslav aircraft of an American C-47 air transport on August 9. United States authorities in Austria and Italy have now reported the results of their investigation in this connection, from which it appears that on August 9 airplane no. 43-15376 of the C-47 type, while on a regular flight from Vienna to Udine encountered bad weather over Klagenfurt and was engaged in an effort to find its bearings when at

approximately 1300 it was attacked by Yugoslav fighters. The attackers fired repeated bursts at the aircraft as a result of which one passenger was seriously wounded and the plane forced to crash land, wheels retracted, in a field near Kranj twelve kilometers from Ljubljana. As for other "violations" of Yugoslav territory referred to in the Foreign Office's note of August 10, alleged to total 172 between July 16 and August 8, United States authorities in Austria and Italy report that only 74 flights have taken place between those dates and that operations officers at Hoersching and Tulln airfields have thoroughly briefed all crews to use approved routes avoiding Yugoslavia.

It would be assumed that the authorities of Yugoslavia would wish to render a maximum of assistance and succor to aircraft of a friendly nation when the latter are forced by the hazards of navigation in bad weather over dangerous mountain barriers to deviate from their course

and seek bearings over Yugoslav territory. On the contrary, Yugoslav fighter aircraft have seen fit without previous warning to take aggressive action against such a United States transport plane, the identification of which was clearly apparent from its markings, and have forced it to crash land after wounding one of its passengers. Subsequently, Yugoslav authorities have detained the plane, its crew and passengers and refused to permit American consular officers access to the plane or personnel until specific representations were made by the United States Embassy to the latter effect. Finally, no reply has been forthcoming to the Embassy's requests that the crew, passengers and plane be released from detention and the personnel permitted to depart from Yugoslavia without delay. Meanwhile, it is reported from Trieste that a second United States plane en route to Italy from Austria is missing after having last reported itself under machine gun attack.

The Embassy is instructed to protest most emphatically against this action and attitude of the Yugoslav authorities, to renew the United States demand for immediate release of the passengers and crew now able to travel, and in conclusion to request an urgent Yugoslav statement whether in the future the United States Government can expect that the Yugoslav Government will accord the usual courtesies, including the right of innocent passage over Yugoslav territory, to United States aircraft when stress of weather necessitates such deviation from regular routes. The Yugoslav authorities have already received United States assurance that United States planes will not cross Yugoslavia without prior clearance except when forced to do so by circumstances over which they have no control. The United States Government, pending receipt of detailed information regarding injury to persons on these two planes and the cost of repairing planes, fully reserves its position in matter of claims for compensation.

¹At the request of correspondents Acting Secretary Acheson on Aug. 20 authorized the release of these reports of American Consul Theodore J. Hohenthal in Zagreb and of the pilot of the C-47 forced down in Yugoslavia Aug. 9, Capt. William Crombie. Both reports are dated Aug. 19 and were released to the press on Aug. 20, 1946.

REPORT OF AMERICAN CONSUL IN ZAGREB¹

United States personnel said they were getting best treatment and only objected being under close guard. The co-pilot told Consul that aircraft which appeared in front of plane bore marking resembling British so he thought they were over Udine and did not understand signal of other plane, but United States plane rocked wings in reply. The co-pilot thought only two planes attacked.

Assistant Military Attaché's report on interview states aircraft fired on by Yugoslav fighter planes, fire continued during descent, last burst just prior to crash landing. None hurt except Turk who had bullet through wrist and body near heart. Aircraft had no mail or official cargo. All personal papers, baggage and ship's log taken by Yugoslavs.

Consul and Assistant Military Attaché were refused permission to see plane and told that this and question of release of men would be decided in Belgrade, so they returned to Zagreb and Belgrade respectively. Our notes to Foreign Office August 13 and 16 requested release but these and our oral protests from August 12 up to today have not yet brought any reply. United States civil passenger was Richard M. Blackburn, father of Charles Blackburn, Clayton, Ohio, R.F.D. 1.

On August 12 Hohenthal and British Military Attaché saw plane lying in small field near hills but were stopped fifty yards away. British Military Attaché said pilot deserves high praise for excellent landing in difficult spot.

REPORT OF CAPTAIN WILLIAM CROMBIE¹

Left Vienna at 11:40 for Udine. The weather was pretty bad but we were able to fly contact half way to Graz. As the weather got bad, we climbed up to 15,000 feet and flew on instruments. We saw Klagenfurt through a hole in the overcast so we then took a heading of 280 degrees (at Klagenfurt, we asked Udine for a QDM but were refused). We continued on this heading for about 15 minutes and then headed south. (We thought we would be north of Udine.) We finally broke out of the clouds and realized we were not over Udine. About that time, a plane (pursuit type) passed us and we all thought it was British. Then two other aircraft passed us and we saw they were Yugoslav.

They flew around us a couple of times and one time they wagged their wings. I was trying to orient myself and at the same time trying to find a field to set down on, an airport. About that time, I saw tracer fire go by right underneath the cockpit. A minute or so later, one of the crewmen came up and said one man was hit. I was about 6,000 feet and I started to find a field to set down in. I then received another burst of fire (I could feel it hit the aircraft). I told everybody to prepare for crash landing and I set the plane down in a small cornfield (wheels up). The landing was rather smooth but both props were thrown off. We pulled the wounded man out and rendered him first aid. The time was about 1400 (our time).

People started collecting and Army officials soon came up. We had to leave our baggage in the plane and were taken into town.

NOTE TO YUGOSLAV CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES

[Released to the press August 21]

Acting Secretary Acheson handed the following note to the Yugoslav Chargé d'Affaires ad interim, Sergije Makiedo, on August 21

SIR:

The American Embassy in Belgrade has informed me of the contents of the message received from the Yugoslav Foreign Office on August 20. The replies of the Yugoslav Government to our inquiries are wholly unsatisfactory to the government and shocking to the people of the United States.

Your government expresses regret because of what you call an unhappy "accident." Your government is aware that this was no accident; that a fighter plane of your government deliberately fired upon a passenger plane of the United States Government. Your government states that one reason for the "accident" was that since August 10th there have been forty-four instances where American planes flew over Yugoslav territory. The records show that since August 10 the total number of flights scheduled for that route was only thirty-two. These flights were made under instructions to avoid flying over Yugoslav territory and if in any instance a plane was over Yugoslav territory it was only because the pilot was forced by bad weather outside of the corridor.

But this attack of August 19th was not the first. On August 9 a United States passenger plane while in the vicinity of Klagenfurt was fired upon by a fighter plane of the Yugoslav Government. It was forced to make a crash landing. When it landed, the crew and passengers were taken into custody by Yugoslav authorities and are still held as prisoners of the Yugoslav Government.

For some days the representative of the United States Government was unable to communicate with these American citizens. Finally he was permitted to do so but only in the presence of the military authorities of Yugoslavia. Twelve days have passed and these American citizens are still held by Yugoslavia.

The message now received from our representative indicates that on the 19th of August when this second passenger plane was fired upon, some if not all, of the occupants were killed. They met their death not by "accident" but by the deliberate acts of Yugoslav authorities. The excuse given for taking the lives of these American citizens is that the plane in which they were travelling was a few kilometers inside of Yugoslav territory. Your government asserts that for twelve minutes prior to the attack the pilot of the plane was "invited" to land. At the time you claim the pilot was "invited" to land the records at Klagenfurt show the pilot advised the Klagenfurt station that he was over Klagenfurt, which is well outside of Yugoslav territory, and was all right.

These outrageous acts have been perpetrated by a government that professes to be a friendly nation. Until we have had opportunity to confer with the survivors of these two attacks and we receive such other evidence as is available, we make no statement as to the exact location of the two planes when they were attacked.

Regardless of whether the planes were a short distance within or without the corridor, they were unarmed passenger planes en route to Udine, in Italy. Their flight in no way constituted a threat to the sovereignty of Yugoslavia. The use of force by Yugoslavia under the circumstances was without the slightest justification in international law, was clearly inconsistent with relations between friendly states, and was a plain violation of the obligations resting upon Yugoslavia under the Charter of the United Nations not to use force except in self-defense. At no time did the Yugo-

slav Government advise the United States Government that if one of its planes should, because of weather conditons, be forced a mile or two outside of the corridor or, because of mechanical troubles, should find itself outside of that corridor, the Yugoslav Government would shoot to death the occupants of the plane. The deliberate firing without warning on the unarmed passenger planes of a friendly nation is in the judgment of the United States an offense against the law of nations and the principles of humanity.

Therefore the Government of the United States demands that you immediately release the occupants of these planes now in your custody and that you insure their safe passage beyond the borders of Yugoslavia.

The Government of the United States also demands that its representatives be permitted to communicate with any of the occupants of the two planes who are still alive.

If within forty-eight hours from the receipt of this note by the Yugoslav Government these demands are complied with, the United States Government will determine its course in the light of the evidence then secured and the efforts of the Yugoslav Government to right the wrong done.

If, however, within that time these demands are not complied with, the United States Government will call upon the Security Council of the United Nations to meet promptly and to take appropriate action.

MESSAGES FROM AMERICAN AMBASSADOR

[Released to the press August 24]

August 22, 9:00 p. m.

Tito received me today in friendly manner accompanied by Colonels Partridge and Stratton and Fraleigh. Two hour conference covered both protest on planes and other points at issue. Regarding planes, I read the Department's August twenty-first note. Tito replied occupants of the first plane were released today and already on way to Trieste; said occupants of second plane have not yet been found. Plane burned in air and very doubtful now that two men parachuted out. Search parties are still out and our request to send representatives with them was granted. Tito also promised to give us remains of planes and allow communication with any survivors. He gave

personal account of forcing down of first plane; promised written account from Fourth Army regarding the second plane. Tito said incidents were not result of any special order and emphatically not retaliation for Yugoslavs shot by American border patrol. Crossing of border by air was infringement of Yugoslav sovereignty and Yugoslav fighters were acting in normal defense of frontier. He had warned repeatedly against continuation of unauthorized flights over Yugoslav territory. He refuted Department's figures of authorized flights as not including frequent unscheduled excursions of military aircraft from Allied fields near Morgan Line.

He said such flights numbered in thousands and were deliberate flaunting of Yugoslav sovereignty and attempt to impress Yugoslavs with Allied strength. Nevertheless, he deplored loss of lives and has now given orders that no foreign planes are to be shot at under any circumstances. Incidents will not be repeated, Marshal said, Yugoslavia will always accept planes forced off course by weather trouble, loss of direction or mechanical difficulties in reasonable numbers and suggested means for signalling distress by such planes be worked out. In reply our statement that at the time allegedly invited to land the second plane reported itself over Klagenfurt, Marshal said thousand people witnessed incident well inside Yugoslav territory. First plane was not "a few kilometers inside Yugoslavia but fifty kilometers". Tito emphasized he is extremely sorry for what happened; promised written confirmation; promised answer other issues raised. In later conferences he agreed to meet demands in our note.

PATTERSON

Undated.

With two Yugoslav officers detailed to assist us we spent today searching for August 19th wreck and bodies in mountains northwest of Bled. By making two hour drive and four hour hike we found wreck smashed and burned on wooded hillside. Peasants there guided us to remains of bodies buried in church yard at Koprivnik village, one hour hike from wreck. Remains were gathered August 20, buried same day by Yugoslav militia patrol. We found patrol leader who told us two bodies were burned in parachutes inside plane. These and fragments of other bodies pointed to

"five or six killed". This contradiction of Tito's statement to us yesterday and tonight (see following telegram) that occupants not yet found is perhaps due to bad staff work.

We are informing Tito of our discoveries and requesting Yugoslav Air Force guard of honor and if Department approved, burial in American Military Cemetery, Belgrade, with full military honors on part of Yugoslavia. We conclude there are no survivors. Plane total loss. Graves registration examining wreck and disinterring remains.

Tomorrow we will see August 9th crash and Turkish passenger in hospital.

Fraleigh and Assistant Military Attache Stratton will return Bled to complete our investigation and I will return to transport bodies to Belgrade by Embassy plane Monday.

PATTERSON

Twenty-third, midnight.

Following is text of letter to me from Tito delivered at 2000 hours Greenwich time tonight, replying Department's note 21st. Letter merely confirms oral statement at our conference yesterday.

"EXCELLENCY:

"With reference to our yesterday conversation have the honor to advise you as follows:

"Regarding the factual state I have nothing to add to the note of the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs No. 9860 of August 20, but solely that subsequent reports do not confirm the first ones according to which two members of the crew would have bailed out in parachutes. It appears now that the parachuting object eye-witnesses mistook for occupants of the plane might have been two gasoline barrels wrapped in two sheets. Investigation still being carried out.

"It is not possible for the moment to produce a definite detailed report of what had happened apart from that I can on this occasion emphasize only once again the statements of the Ministry's note quoted above which correctly described the circumstances which were causing this regrettable occurrence. In connection with the statements put forth during our conversation yesterday, I have first to point out that it is not correct that the plane had only been a mile or two within Yugoslav territory in the moment when forced down. The plane was 50 kilometers from the nearest point on the frontier. Further I have to underline

once more that the Yugoslav fighters were, during almost a quarter of an hour time, inciting the plane to land. They also wanted to show the route to the airport only three miles far away but the aircraft definitely refused compliance with the landing order. Accordingly it does not correspond with the facts the Yugoslav fighters had not warned the plane nor is it correct that the plane had been forced because of weather conditions to deviate from its course. It is notorious in the country where the accident took place that the day was absolutely clear and of perfect visibility.

"As for the occupants of the plane forced down August 9, once the investigation got terminated the Yugoslav Government suspended on August 21 any movement limitation imposed upon the persons concerned. During, and for the purpose of the investigation itself, Mr. Hohenthal, the American Consul, was informed thereof and at 730 hours on August 22 he took over. It is evident that they are allowed to leave Yugoslavia whenever they want to. Your Government may also, of course, dispose at any time over the aircraft question.

"As for the occupants of the plane which crashed on August 19, as already mentioned, none has been found so far. The Yugoslav Government will be only glad to permit the representative of your Government to communicate with any of them who might have survived.

"Respectfully yours,

"August 23

"J. B. TITO"

PATTERSON

The messages received from Ambassador Patterson indicate that the demands presented to the Yugoslav Government by the United States Government have been complied with.

As stated in the note of August 21, in this situation the United States Government will determine its course in the light of the evidence secured and the efforts of the Yugoslav Government to right the wrong done. Full reports as to the foregoing, including the reports of the survivors of the attack of August 9th, which will be made directly to the Secretary of State and Senator Connally in Paris, have not yet been received in Washington.

No further announcement will be made as to the attitude of the United States Government until such reports have been received and examined.

Position on Question of the Turkish Straits

EXCHANGE OF NOTES BETWEEN THE SOVIET CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AND ACTING SECRETARY ACHESON¹

EMBASSY OF THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS,
Washington, D. C., August 7, 1946.

SIR:

By direction of the Soviet Government I have the honor to communicate to you the following:

As is known, the Berlin Conference of the Three Powers on the question of the Montreux Convention adopted a resolution, whereby the three governments declared that the said convention should be revised, since it does not correspond to present conditions. At the same time the three governments agreed that this question was to be the subject of direct negotiations between each of the Three Powers and the Turkish Government. In accordance with this, the Soviet Government on August 7 of this year addressed to the Turkish Government a note which is transcribed below:

"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR has the honor to inform the Turkish Government of the following:

"Events which occurred during the past war clearly indicated that the regime of the Black Sea Straits, established by the Straits Convention, signed in 1936 at Montreux, does not meet the interests of the safety of the Black Sea Powers and does not insure conditions under which the use of these Straits for purposes inimical to the Black Sea Powers would be prevented.

"It will suffice to mention a series of incidents during this war, when the Axis Powers directed their warships and auxiliary craft through the Straits into the Black Sea and out of the Black Sea, which in turn gave rise to the corresponding steps and protests registered by the Soviet Government with the Turkish Government.

"On July 9, 1941 the German command sent the German patrol boat 'Seefalke' through the Straits into the Black Sea, which was a gross violation of the Straits Convention and called forth a protest to the Turkish Government on the part of the Soviet Government.

"In August 1941, Turkish authorities gave the Italian auxiliary war vessel 'Tarvizio' permission to pass through the Straits into the Black Sea, which likewise called forth a representation on the part of the Soviet Government, calling to the attention of the Turkish Government the fact that the passage of the Italian auxiliary vessel into the Black Sea would appear to be a violation of the Straits Convention.

"On November 4, 1942, the Soviet Government again called to the attention of the Turkish Government the fact that Germany planned to send to the Black Sea through the Straits auxiliary war ships under the guise of merchant vessels with a total displacement of 140,000 tons. These vessels were intended for the transfer of military forces and war materials of the Axis countries into the Black Sea. In its representation, the Soviet Government emphasized the fact that 'the admission of the aforementioned vessels through the Straits into the Black Sea would be an obvious violation of the Convention regarding the regime of the Straits concluded in Montreux, inasmuch as these vessels are left at the disposal of the German Government and are in reality auxiliary warships.'

"In June 1944, the Soviet Government registered a protest against the fact that toward the end of May and early in June of 1944 there took place a series of passages through the Straits from the Black Sea into the Aegean Sea of German warships and auxiliary warships of varying tonnage of the 'Ems' (8 vessels) and 'Kriegtransport' (5 vessels) types, which had taken part in the naval operations in the Black Sea.

¹ Copies of Acting Secretary Acheson's note have also been transmitted to the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, which were among the signatories of the Montreux Convention of July 20, 1936.

"It is obvious from the aforementioned facts that at the time of the past war with Germany and her allies, the Straits Convention did not prevent the enemy powers from using the Straits for military purposes against the U.S.S.R. and other allied powers, with the Turkish Government not being able to escape the responsibility for this situation.

"In view of this, the Soviet Government suggested to the Berlin Conference of the Three Powers—Great Britain, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, which took place in July and August 1945, to discuss the question that the regime of the Straits, established by the Montreux Convention, does not conform to present conditions and that it is necessary to establish a new regime of the Straits. As is known, the Berlin Conference of the Three Powers adopted a resolution consisting of the following:

"a) The three governments declared that the Convention regarding the Straits, concluded in Montreux, should be revised, as it does not meet the conditions of the present time;

"b) The three governments agreed that as the proper course the said question would be the subject of direct negotiations between each of the three powers and the Turkish Government.

"The Soviet Government is also acquainted with the contents of the note of November 2, 1945 of the Government of the United States of America and with the note of the British Government of November 21, 1945 addressed to the Government of Turkey on this question.

"For its own part, the Soviet Government proposes to establish for the Straits a new regime, proceeding from the following principles:

"1) The Straits should be always open to the passage of merchant ships of all countries.

"2) The Straits should be always open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea Powers.

"3) Passage through the Straits for warships not belonging to the Black Sea Powers shall not be permitted except in cases specially provided for.

"4) The establishment of a regime of the Straits, as the sole sea passage, leading from the Black Sea and to the Black Sea, should come under the competence of Turkey and other Black Sea Powers.

"5) Turkey and the Soviet Union, as the powers most interested and capable of guaranteeing free-

dom to commercial navigation and security in the Straits, shall organize joint means of defense of the Straits for the prevention of the utilization of the Straits by other countries for aims hostile to the Black Sea Powers.

"The Soviet Government is informing the governments of the United States of America and Great Britain regarding the present declaration."

The Soviet Union has directed me to bring this to the knowledge of the Government of the United States of America.

Accept [etc.]

FEDOR OREKHOV

Acting Secretary of State DEAN ACHESON,
Department of State, Washington.

August 19, 1946.

SIR:

I acknowledge receipt of your note of August 7, 1946, which sets forth the text of the note addressed on the same day by the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the Government of the Republic of Turkey and express the appreciation of this Government for the courtesy of the Soviet Government in making this information available.

It will be recalled that the American Embassy in Moscow made available to the Soviet Government in November 1945 a copy of the note which the American Embassy in Ankara delivered to the Turkish Government on November 2, 1945.¹

This Government has given careful study to the views expressed by the Soviet Government in its note to the Turkish Government. It would appear from a comparison of this Government's note of November 2, 1945, with the Soviet note to the Turkish Government of August 7, 1946, that the views of the Governments of the United States and of the Soviet Union, while not in entire accord, are in general agreement with regard to the three following proposals set forth in the Soviet note:

"1. The Straits should be always open to the passage of merchant ships of all countries.

"2. The Straits should be always open to the passage of warships of the Black Sea powers.

"3. Passage through the Straits for warships

¹ Substance of note printed in BULLETIN of Nov. 11, 1945, p. 766.

not belonging to the Black Sea powers shall not be permitted except in cases specially provided for."

The fourth proposal set forth in the Soviet note does not appear to envisage a revision of the Montreux Convention, as suggested in our note to the Turkish Government of November 2, 1945, but rather the establishment of a new régime which would be confined to Turkey and the other Black Sea powers. It is the view of this Government that the régime of the Straits is a matter of concern not only to the Black Sea powers but also to other powers, including the United States. This Government cannot, therefore, agree with the Soviet view that the establishment of the régime of the Straits should come under the competence of the Black Sea powers to the exclusion of other powers.

The fifth proposal set forth in the note of the Soviet Government was that Turkey and the Soviet Union should organize joint means of defense of the Straits. It is the firm opinion of this Gov-

ernment that Turkey should continue to be primarily responsible for the defense of the Straits. Should the Straits become the object of attack or threat of attack by an aggressor, the resulting situation would constitute a threat to international security and would clearly be a matter for action on the part of the Security Council of the United Nations.

It is observed that the note of the Soviet Government contains no reference to the United Nations. The position of the Government of the United States is that the régime of the Straits should be brought into appropriate relationship with the United Nations and should function in a manner entirely consistent with the principles and aims of the United Nations.

The Government of the United States reaffirms its willingness to participate in a conference called to revise the Montreux Convention.

Accept [etc.]

DEAN ACHESON
Acting Secretary of State

Views on Arrangements for Polish Elections

NOTE TO THE POLISH PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

[Released to the press August 20]

Text of a note delivered by the American Ambassador to Poland, Arthur Bliss Lane, to the Polish Foreign Office on August 19

I have been instructed by my Government to inform you that it has been glad to learn of the announcement that the Polish Provisional Government intends to promulgate electoral laws during the month of August and to hold elections early in the month of November. My Government is deeply conscious of the grave responsibility which it assumed, together with the British and Soviet Governments, by the decisions taken at the Crimea and Potsdam conferences with respect to the holding of free and unfettered elections in Poland. During the conversations which were held in Moscow in June 1945 the Polish leaders agreed to the acceptance of the principles formulated at Yalta. Accordingly, the Polish Government which was then functioning in Poland was reorganized and there was created the Polish Provisional Govern-

ment of National Unity, with which the Governments of the Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States established diplomatic relations.

In departing from its traditional policy by assuming responsibilities in connection with the internal affairs of another State, my Government was motivated by the feeling that as one of the principal powers engaged in liberating the peoples of Europe from the yoke of Nazi aggression, it had a special responsibility to assist in giving the Polish people who had suffered so greatly from Nazi occupation an opportunity freely to choose the government under which they would live. My Government feels, therefore, that it has both the right and the duty to bring the following to the attention of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

The United States Government considers that it had no responsibilities in connection with the referendum held in Poland on June 30. Nevertheless, as the Polish Ambassador in Washington

informed my Government on April 24, 1946, this referendum was a measure preparatory to the election and the methods by which it was held bear a relation to the preparations for holding the election itself.¹ The official representatives of the United States Government in Poland have reported that the voting in the referendum appeared to have been generally carried out in a correct and fair manner but that the methods used in tabulating the ballots and reporting the vote have given rise to charges of serious irregularities, including removal of ballot boxes from polling places in contravention of the referendum law.

It has also been brought to the attention of my Government that the Polish Labor Party charges that it was not allowed to hold its party congress and that as a result of this and administrative persecution of the party by arrests, censorship restrictions, administrative interference and other oppressive acts which have prevented normal democratic political activity, the Central Committee of the Labor Party has requested the membership of that party to suspend all political activity until such time as the attitude of the Polish Provisional Government toward the Labor Party has changed. The Polish Provisional Government is, of course, aware that one of the essential elements in the agreement for the holding of free elections in Poland is that all democratic, anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates. To this end it is necessary that all democratic parties be free to engage in political activity in the period preceding the elections.

Furthermore, my Government has learned with great regret that steps have been taken depriving the Polish Peasant Party of its right to assemble and to perform normal party functions at numerous points within Poland. According to reliable information the facilities which other parties enjoy in publishing electoral or party material, in using the radio for propaganda purposes and the ability to make known the views of the party through public posters and other forms of advertisement are, through censorship or other means, either denied to the Polish Peasant Party or restricted to a degree less than that accorded the parties adhering to the so-called government bloc.

In view of the foregoing, my Government

wishes to emphasize its belief that *inter alia* it is essential for the carrying out of free elections that (1) all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall be allowed to conduct election campaigns freely without arrest or threat of arrest. The parties recognized as "democratic and anti-Nazi parties" include the following: The Polish Workers Party (PPR), the Democratic Party (SD), the Polish Socialist Party (PPS), the Polish Peasant Party (PSL), the Peasant Party (SL), and the Labor Party (SP); (2) all such parties shall be represented on all electoral commissions and ballots be counted in presence of representatives of all such parties; (3) results shall be published immediately by local districts; and (4) there shall be an adequate system of appealing election disputes.

My Government is confident that the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity will take into account the views presented above in making arrangements for the elections.

FISHER—Continued from page 398.

delivery of Soviet goods needed by Yugoslavia for the conduct of the war and for its civilian population in exchange for Yugoslav goods needed by the Soviet Union for its war requirements and national economy.

III

Since the purpose of this article is only to describe the treaties and agreements entered into by the U.S.S.R. with other countries in the year 1945, no attempt has been made to analyze or interpret their terms. It is apparent, however, that most of these treaties and agreements are contained within five categories: (1) implementation and adjustment of reparations growing out of armistice agreements to which the Soviet Union is a party; (2) bilateral trade agreements on a barter basis; (3) economic-collaboration agreements and the agreements subsumed thereunder; (4) pacts of friendship, mutual assistance, and post-war collaboration; and (5) exchange of nationals. The year 1945 also saw diplomatic relations reestablished with four minor enemy powers and one liberated state.

¹ BULLETIN of May 5, 1946, p. 762.

Revision of Greek Electoral Lists

SUMMARY OF REPORT OF ALLIED MISSION

[Released to the press August 19]

On June 18, 1946 it was announced that Leland B. Morris, former U. S. Ambassador to Iran, had been appointed by the President, with the personal rank of Ambassador, to head the United States Section of the Allied Mission to Observe the Revision of Greek Electoral Lists.¹

Since the first of July Ambassador Morris and the members of his staff have been in Greece, where they have been working in closest cooperation with British and South African members of the Mission in the task of observing the revision of electoral lists being carried out by the Greek Government. The report of the Mission has now been completed and signed in Athens. The following summary of its conclusions is being released to the press simultaneously in Athens, London, and Washington:

"The Mission is satisfied that the revision and recom compilations of the electoral lists as observed by it attain a degree of fairness and accuracy which justifies their use in seeking the opinion of the Greek people in matters of national import.

"The Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections, in its report of April 10, 1946,² recommended that, before the opinion of the Greek people was again sought on matters of national import, there should be a complete revision of the registration lists in order to remove all possible justification for any criticism based on the inaccuracy of the lists.

"On April 14, 1946, the Greek Government acting on this recommendation invited the observer nations to permit their observers to remain in Greece in order to observe the revision and recompilation of the electoral lists, but this course was not possible owing to the fact that the resources of the Mission had been dispersed, although the nations agreed in principle that the request was worthy of consideration.

"On May 13 it was announced by the Regent

that the plebiscite was to be held in Greece on September 1, 1946, and on June 26 the Greek Assembly adopted the plebiscite decree.

"On May 10, 1946, the Greek Government formally invited the British and United States Governments to send observers to Greece. This invitation was accepted by the two Governments. The purpose of the Mission was to observe the revision and recompilation of the Greek electoral lists, to draw to the attention of the Greek Government matters requiring adjustment or alteration in the conduct of the revision and recompilation, to investigate the revised and recompiled lists, and to report its findings.

"In order to emphasize the continuity of the former Mission with the Mission to Observe the Revision of the Electoral Lists, it was decided that the latter should be referred to as AMFOGE 2, the earlier Mission having been known as AMFOGE 1.

"The Mission consisted of two Chiefs of Mission, Ambassador Leland Morris, Chief of the American contingent, and Mr. R. T. Windle, Chief of the British contingent. Mr. Raymond Jessen of the Statistical Laboratory of Iowa State College, Ames, Iowa, was appointed chief of the statistical section. Upon his departure for the U.S. he was succeeded by W. Edwards Deming of the U.S. Bureau of the Budget, Washington, D.C., on July 29, 1946. There were 66 United States, British and South African observer teams deployed in position according to a plan laid down for phase two of the observation. Each team consisted of an observer, a Greek interpreter and a driver. The British and South African observers were all drawn from members of Armed Forces. The American observers were all civilians, being advanced students or instructors from American universities who had been recently demobilized from the Armed Forces. In addition there were headquarters and district staffs for administrative purposes amounting to approximately 50 persons. The work of the Mission was

¹ BULLETIN of June 30, 1946, p. 1128.

² BULLETIN of Apr. 21, 1946, p. 671.

designed to occupy two phases: Phase one, to be the period of registration in which the observers were required to collect information with regard to the operation of the registration machinery; Phase two, to analyze the electoral lists on the completion of the revision and recompilation of the lists. The Chiefs of Mission agreed on a plan which would permit the sampling plan devised to be put into operation in order to extract the maximum of information from the whole of Greece.

"Operations were directed by a central board appointed by the Chiefs of Mission. To this end all of Greece was divided into seven districts centered upon Athens, Tripolis, Patras, Ioannina, Salonika, Larissa and Crete, and regional headquarters were set up at these places under a district director and a statistician.

"During the operation of phase one, which was timed to coincide with the registration period, approximately 600 places were visited in which the Greek registration officials and the local representatives of political parties were interviewed to ascertain in what manner the registration machinery was functioning and whether political leaders were satisfied therewith. Phase two of the

observation was devoted to interviewing households selected on a scientific basis and to examining the electoral lists, seeking information on a carefully prepared plan from which statistical conclusions could be reached. In this survey an adequate number of basic lists were examined and households visited to secure the necessary statistical information. Selection of households was not haphazard but in accordance with a plan devised by the statisticians which gave every household and every elector an equal probability of being drawn into the sample.

"This investigation produced the following information: The Mission assesses the population of Greece at 7.49 million; of this figure 2.06 million represent male citizens 21 years or over and of that number 1.7 million were on the electoral lists as voters, i. e., 81.6 percent; 18.4 percent remain to be accounted for. This figure is made up in part of persons who have not qualified to register or who have not applied to be registered on the electoral lists. Modern methods of sampling were used in which the Mission had the utmost confidence. The data were obtained by the arduous work of observers aided by the cooperation of all the Greek people with whom they came into contact."

Allied Mission To Remain in Greece for Informal Observation

[Released to the press August 24]

In connection with the plebiscite scheduled to be held in Greece on September 1, 1946, the Greek Government recently requested that the Allied mission which has been in Greece for nearly two months observing the revision of electoral lists, and whose report was signed in Athens on August 19, remain in Greece to observe the voting on the day of the plebiscite. The United States Government felt unable to accede to this request, as the present staff of observers in Greece is inadequate to undertake the much larger task of observing and reporting on the plebiscite, and considered it impracticable, within the space of time available, to dispatch to Greece the additional personnel and equipment required to observe the plebiscite on a

scale comparable to the observation of the Greek elections last March.

However, after further discussions with the Greek Government it has been agreed that the mission will remain through the plebiscite for informal observation on a limited scale and that if possible a small number of additional American observers will be sent to Greece for this purpose. No formal report will be issued to the Greek Government by the observers, but their reports on conditions under which the plebiscite is carried out will be made directly to their respective governments. It is considered that this limited observation will furnish to the United States Government much useful information regarding the conduct of the plebiscite.

Discussions With Greek Economic Mission Concluded

[Released to the press August 22]

On August 1, 1946 a special Greek Economic Mission consisting of four members arrived in Washington. Former Prime Minister Sophocles Venizelos, head of the Mission, was accompanied by Michael Ailianos, Deputy Minister of Coordination, and Anastasios Bakalbassis and Konstantine Karamanlis, members of Parliament.

The purpose of this parliamentary mission, representing both the majority party in the present Greek Government and the opposition, was to discuss with United States officials the present conditions in Greece and the general economic, financial, and reconstruction problems of Greece. The mission wished also to examine and to consult with appropriate United States authorities on procurement and supply questions raised by the imminent cessation of UNRRA activities and on methods of facilitating the revival of trade through normal commercial channels.

During a three weeks' stay, members of the mission discussed these matters with the President, the Acting Secretary of State, the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, the Secretaries of Treasury and Commerce, officers of the Export-Import Bank, and many other Government officials. They also met with officers of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

The exchange of views has given United States officials an opportunity to acquaint themselves in more detail with measures which the Greek Government is taking and intends to take in the direction of economic rehabilitation, financial stability, and the revival of trade.

Among the subjects on which progress was made during the visit of the mission were: Improved arrangements for coal allocations; additional allocation of cotton textiles and plans for improving the Greek textile industry; arrangements for the purchase by Greek ship-owners of vessels to build up the shattered Greek merchant marine; and promotion of Greek exports to provide exchange for required imports.

Progress was also made in the discussion of methods to facilitate the early and effective utilization of the \$25,000,000 credit granted to Greece

in January 1946 by the Export-Import Bank, as well as the purchase of materials urgently needed for Greek reconstruction and rehabilitation under the \$10,000,000 surplus-property credit made available to Greece last May.

Conversations were held which it is hoped will lead in the near future to a mutually satisfactory settlement of lend-lease to Greece. Discussions were also held with Treasury officials with a view to the early unblocking of Greek assets in the United States which are frozen under Executive Order 8389.

Meetings of mutual benefit were arranged between members of the mission and representatives of American tobacco firms with the aim of exploring possibilities of increased exports of Greek tobacco to the United States, which constitutes one of the chief items in Greek economy.

On August 22 Mr. Venizelos and Mr. Ailianos left the United States for Paris, to be followed shortly by the other members of the mission. This Government is happy to take this occasion to express its feeling that recent discussions with the mission have been most profitable and that the exchange of views has clarified many of the problems which affect both this Government and the Greek Government in financial, economic, and commercial fields. It is recognized that many of the difficulties encountered by the Greek people since liberation resulted directly from a deliberate policy of the enemy occupying forces to disrupt Greek economic and financial stability and to destroy Government administrative machinery. This Government reaffirmed to the mission its earnest desire to see Greece restored once more to economic health and to render effective assistance in the efforts of the Greek Government to solve its urgent problems.

Inter-American Automotive Traffic

On August 8, 1946 the President ratified the convention on the regulation of inter-American automotive traffic, which was signed on behalf of the United States on December 31, 1943. The instrument of ratification will be deposited with the Pan American Union.

Claims of American Nationals Against Enemy Countries on Mistreatment of Prisoners of War

JOINT STATEMENT BY THE STATE, WAR, AND NAVY DEPARTMENTS

[Released to the press by the State, War, and Navy Departments August 19]

Governmental agencies, veteran organizations, and the American Red Cross are receiving inquiries from American military or naval prisoners of war and civilians detained by enemy countries, their families, or their representatives, concerning claims against such countries for death or personal injury received or for money due for labor performed as a prisoner of war during the period of detention. Such inquiries relate to the possibility of recovering compensation from enemy countries on account of such deaths or mistreatment and the necessity of employing attorneys to prepare and prosecute such claims; the advisability of placing such claims in the hands of committees or associations purporting to render services of that nature; and the standing and reliability of such committees or associations.

Pending the conclusion of peace treaties with enemy countries, or the enactment of legislation by the Congress, it will not be possible to indicate the precise procedure which will be adopted to deal with claims of American nationals against enemy countries or what types of claims may be entitled to share in such funds as may become available for the settlement of claims. Bills have already been introduced in the Congress looking toward the allocation of a portion of the assets of enemy countries held by the United States to the payment of proper claims by American nationals. However, none of the bills so far introduced has passed the preliminary stages. It is expected that further attention will be given this problem by the Congress.

There is no present provision for claims relating to death or personal injury of American military or civilian prisoners, or for claims on account of labor performed by them. Provision for the settlement of claims of these latter types is for future legislative consideration.

With a view to rendering as much governmental assistance as possible to former prisoners or their next of kin, and in order to obviate the necessity

of their employing representatives or committees or associations to prepare their claims, representatives of the State, War, Justice, and Navy Departments are currently engaged in devising procedures and in preparation of official forms for the use of claimants who may desire to submit, for possible future consideration, claims against enemy countries. When such procedures are completed and the forms available, full publicity will be given as to the manner and place for filing such claims. It is expected that claims will be routed through the War and Navy Departments (in the case of members of the armed services) or directly to the State Department (in the case of civilians) and that such data as is now available to the War and Navy Departments will be added to the files. None of the committees or organizations now soliciting claims is sponsored by the War, Navy, or State Departments, either officially or unofficially.

GERMAN DOCUMENTS—Continued from page 403.

necessity of making peace with Germany. If one were to read the speeches of Lloyd George and the other English leaders of the time, he would find no mention at all of such a situation, but they were just as boastful and brazen as the present speeches of Churchill.

Admiral Nomura again declared that he believed that the shipping war was of greatest importance, and he said that the Americans would first have to transport their troops over all the oceans of the world before they could employ them in battle anywhere. This was the great advantage of Germany and Japan, and the interruption of lines of communication was our great opportunity.

The Reich Foreign Minister bade Admiral Nomura farewell with his best and heartiest wishes for a good return journey to Tokyo and with the hope of further effective collaboration in the interest of the common cause.

GOTTFRIEDSEN

FUSCHL, April 19, 1943

Long-Range Policy Statement for German Re-education¹

[Released to the press August 21]

1. The re-education of the German people can be effective only as it is an integral part of a comprehensive program for their rehabilitation. The cultural and moral re-education of the nation must, therefore, be related to policies calculated to restore the stability of a peaceful German economy and to hold out hope for the ultimate recovery of national unity and self-respect.²

2. In the initial phases of control, Military Government has been concerned with the elimination of Nazi and militaristic doctrines and practices and the permanent exclusion of objectionable persons from posts of influence. These objectives will continue to be its concern. At the same time, a program for the reconstitution of German cultural life has been initiated.

3. The political and moral re-education of the German people will foster the re-establishment of universally valid principles of justice.

4. The German people must come to understand that the Nazi repudiation of these principles destroyed all individual rights in the Nazi state, made the effort at world tyranny inevitable and brought Germany to its present disaster. They must come to understand that the present control measures over Germany are not prompted solely by the German violation of the rights of other peoples. They were also made necessary by the political chaos in Germany, which was the direct

consequence of the Nazi denial of all political rights and destruction of all alternative organized forces within the nation.

5. The primary principles of justice, basic to the program of re-education are:

(a) That men and nations owe obligations to each other; and that these responsibilities are not, as Nazism maintained, limited to a single race, nation or group.

(b) That the dignity and integrity of the individual must be respected by society and other individuals; and that the individual is not, as Nazism maintained, merely a tool of the state.

(c) That citizens bear their share of responsibility for public policy and that they have the right and duty to participate in government resting on the consent of the governed.

(d) That the untrammelled pursuit of truth is a prerequisite for the maintenance of justice; and that free communication between individuals, groups and nations is a necessary condition for national and international understanding. Experience with Nazism proves what evil consequences flow from the suppression and corruption of the truth.

(e) That toleration between diverse cultural and racial groups is the basis of national and international tranquillity; and that coerced unity of culture, after the manner of Nazism, is the source of tyranny and anarchy.

6. The program of German re-education will make maximum use of those German resources which offer promise of developing ideals and institutions in harmony with the above stated universally valid principles of justice. The reconstruction of the cultural life of Germany must be in large measure the work of the Germans themselves and must be fostered not only on a regional but also on a national scale.

7. The Nazi heritage of Germany's spiritual isolation must be overcome by restoring as rapidly as possible those cultural contacts which will foster the assimilation of the German people into the society of peaceful nations.

¹ Assistant Secretary Benton, coincident with the announcement of the appointment of the Education Mission to Germany, released the "Long-Range Policy Statement for German Re-education," prepared at the behest of the State Department by a committee of American educators consisting of: Edmund E. Day, president, Cornell University; Eduard C. Lindeman, New York School of Social Work; Martin McGuire, dean, graduate school, Catholic University; Reinhold Niebuhr, professor of theology, Union Theological Seminary; John Milton Potter, president, Hobart College; Frank P. Graham, president, University of North Carolina; George N. Shuster, president, Hunter College. This statement was released on August 13, 1946 in Germany by Lt. Gen. Lucius Clay, Deputy Director, Military Government in Germany.

² For an article on the Present Status of German Youth see BULLETIN of July 14, 21, and 28, 1946.

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
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
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Education Mission to Germany

[Released to the press August 20]

Assistant Secretary Benton, in response to a request by the War Department, has issued a joint invitation on behalf of the Department of State and the War Department to a number of distinguished American educators to serve as members of an education mission to Germany. A similar mission recently returned from Japan, and a report of its findings has been published.¹

The proposal to send the mission to Germany, which originated with the War Department, received the full approval of Lt. Gen. Lucius D. Clay, Deputy Military Governor, Office of Military Government for Germany in Berlin. The members were selected by the two departments in consultation with the Office of United States Military Government in Germany and with the advice of the United States Office of Education. The Mission will observe and evaluate the education program of United States Military Government in that country and will submit a report setting forth the results of its work. "The sending of the Mission is in keeping with the long-range constructive policy on German reeducation released August 13, 1946 by the Office of Military Government in Berlin," said Assistant Secretary Benton.

It is expected that the group will depart on August 22 from Washington and will spend approximately one month in Germany.

The group will be composed of the following educators:

GEORGE F. ZOOK, President, American Council on Education, *Chairman*

BESS GOODYKOONTZ, Director, Division of Elementary Education, United States Office of Education

HENRY H. HILL, President, George Peabody College for Teachers, Nashville, Tenn.

PAUL M. LIMBERT, President, YMCA College, Springfield, Mass.

EARL J. McGRATH, Dean, University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa

REINHOLD NIEBUHR, Professor, Union Theological Seminary, New York, N. Y.

REV. FELIX NEWTON PITT, Secretary, Catholic School Board, Louisville, Ky.

LAWRENCE ROGIN, Director of Education, Textile Workers Union of America, CIO, New York, N. Y.

T. V. SMITH, Professor, University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

HELEN C. WHITE, Professor, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis.

EUGENE N. ANDERSON, Department of State

Arrival of Students From Near East and Far East To Attend Universities

[Released to the press August 19]

There were 339 foreign students aboard the *Marine Lynx* when it docked at San Francisco on August 25, the State Department announced. They plan to attend American universities and colleges. Of these students, 312 are from India, 5 from Iran, 8 from Iraq, and 14 from China.

Fellowship grants from the Indian Government will support 177 Indian students; 132 will be financed through private sources; two Burmese nurses—wearers of the Bronze Star for heroism—will study on Mayo Clinic fellowships, with only their transportation expenses being paid by the Department; and one Indian student will come to the United States on a State Department fellowship.

The Indian Government expects to maintain approximately 2,000 Government-supported students in American educational institutions within the next few years. This is in contrast to the small number of Indian students now in the United States.

Representatives of the Department conferred with officials of more than 100 American colleges and universities at Chicago from April 29 to May 2. The common problem was: "Shall we bring in foreign students?" It was overwhelmingly decided that as many foreign students as possible should be welcomed since these foreign students were taking graduate courses and would not come

¹ Summary of report was published in BULLETIN of May 5, 1946, p. 767.

in such numbers as to interfere with the largely undergraduate educational provisions for war veterans. In some instances colleges asked for more foreign students than the Department considered advisable, and their quota was limited rather than extended.

A delegation from the Department will be on hand when the SS *Marine Lynx* docks at San Francisco to welcome the Indian students.

Course for American Students at the University of Stockholm

[Released to the press August 22]

The Department of State has been informed by the American Legation at Stockholm, Sweden, that the University of Stockholm has announced the inauguration of a special course for United States students, to begin in the spring of 1947. Although this course is designed primarily to meet the needs of veterans studying abroad under the "GI Bill of Rights", other qualified candidates will be eligible also.

A knowledge of Swedish will not be required for the first semester's work, which will be conducted in English and will provide intensive training in the Swedish language and Scandinavian institutions. In the following semesters, courses will be available in the Swedish language; Swedish social, economic, and political conditions; Scandinavian history and culture; and scientific and technical developments in Sweden. The University of Stockholm is one of the outstanding institutions of Europe and has been approved by the Veterans Administration for study under the GI bill. American students desiring credit in an American university for their studies in Stockholm should secure the approval of the American institution concerned before going to Sweden.

Tuition costs and fees will amount to \$250 a semester. Special assistance to the students in obtaining board and room at reasonable costs will be provided by the University. It is estimated by the Swedish Legation that United States students can live in Stockholm comfortably on from \$65 to \$100 a month. However, students should be prepared for possible higher expenses should present conditions change.

United States students who have successfully completed one year of study in an accredited college or university, or its equivalent, are eligible for the course. Further information on this course may be obtained from the Legation of Sweden, 1900 Twenty-fourth Street, NW., Washington, D.C., or the Institute of International Education, 2 West Forty-fifth Street, New York 19, N.Y. Applications are being received by the Institute of International Education and must be submitted before October 15, 1946. Successful candidates will be notified by December 20, 1946 and will have ample time to reach Stockholm for the beginning of the spring semester, February 15, 1947.

Veterans desiring to study under the GI bill at the University of Stockholm should fill out and submit form 1950 to the Veterans Administration, Washington, D.C. If the veteran is living abroad, he should submit his form 1950 to the nearest United States diplomatic or consular officer. These forms must be submitted in addition to the standard application form which will be accepted by the Institute of International Education.

Maintenance and Travel Grants to Philippine Graduate Students

[Released to the press August 15]

The Department of State announced the awarding of 12 maintenance and travel grants to graduate students from the Philippines for one year of study in the United States. The following men and women have been selected for the grants:

Lydia Arguilla will undertake work in journalism and public relations at the University of Colorado with special emphasis on civic education and city planning.

Romeo Y. Atienza expects to do advanced work in safety education and industrial hygiene at the Harvard University school of public health.

Mario Clutario expects to study public law at the University of California, which has awarded him a tuition fellowship.

Aurora Dino will do work in sociology and social work under a tuition fellowship provided by the University of Denver.

Lolita Corpus Garcia plans to study nutrition and food chemistry at the University of Colorado.

Angel Rizal Hidalgo will study English and educational psychology at Ohio State University, which has awarded him a tuition fellowship.

Felicitimo Kiamco of Oriental Negros will specialize in organic chemistry and the industrialization of agricultural products at the University of California under a tuition fellowship.

Francisco Lopez plans to undertake special studies in rayon manufacturing and plastics technology.

Augusto Resurreccion plans to study public law at the University of Minnesota.

Celso Santos of Laguna Province will study agricultural chemistry and food preservation at Oregon State College under a tuition fellowship awarded by the college.

José Velasco of Laguna Province will specialize in plant physiology and systematic botany at the University of California which has granted remission of tuition.

Domiciano K. Villaluz will specialize in oceanography and fish culture at the University of Washington.

Treaty Obligations and Philippine Independence

REPLY OF EGYPTIAN GOVERNMENT TO U. S. NOTE¹

ROYAL EGYPTIAN LEGATION

Washington, D.C., August 15, 1946.

I have the honour to refer to your letter dated May 4, 1946 informing me that your Government made a provision for a transitional period for dealing with the special tariff position which Philippine products have occupied before independence. Accordingly, under the Philippine Trade Act approved April 30, 1946, goods the growth, produce or manufacture of the Philippines will enter the United States free of duty until 1954, after which they will be subject to gradually and regularly increasing rates of duty or decreasing duty-free quotas until 1974 when general rates will become applicable and all preferences will be completely eliminated.

I have the pleasure to inform you that after referring the contents of your communication to my Government, I have been authorized to state that until the expiration date of the exceptional treatment of Philippine imports, my Government does not intend to invoke the most-favored-nation clause under the Provisional Commercial Agree-

ment between the United States of America and Egypt effected by an exchange of notes signed May 24, 1930.

Accept [etc.]

M. HASSAN

DEAN ACHESON

*Acting Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.*

Oil and International Relations

A discussion of oil and international relations by John A. Loftus and Charles B. Rayner of the Department of State and Col. G. H. Vogel, Executive Officer of the Army-Navy Petroleum Board, was broadcast on August 17 and released to the press on the same date. It was one in a group of State Department programs of the NBC University of the Air series entitled "Our Foreign Policy". Selden Menefee of the NBC University of the Air served as chairman.

Corrigenda

American Policy in Occupied Areas

In an article on American policy in occupied areas that appeared in the BULLETIN of August 18, 1946, on page 293, left-hand column, last two lines, change "Allied Control Council for Japan" to read "Allied Council for Japan".

The Foreign Service Act of 1946

In the BULLETIN of August 18, 1946, page 333, left-hand column, lines 8 and 9, change "November 2" to read "November 13".

The Foreign Service

Consular Offices

The American Consulate at Horta, Fayal, Azores, was closed to the public on June 30.

The Consulate General at Bratislava, Czechoslovakia, was established on August 14.

¹ U.S. note is similar to note sent to Bolivian Government as printed in BULLETIN of June 16, 1946, p. 1049.

Training Announcements

CLERICAL TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES, DIVISION OF TRAINING SERVICES

State Department Correspondence—Particularly important for stenographers who are new in the Department. It covers the format of the various kinds of correspondence used in the Department, with practice on those most frequently used; use of the Correspondence Handbook and other materials; and routing of correspondence. The instructor, Miss Eoline Howze, has had 25 years' experience in the Department.

Typewriting 1—For employees with previous training in touch typewriting whose speed or accuracy is low. It serves as a basic review, with emphasis on keyboard mastery and machine controls. Instructor, Miss Fairah Cruzan.

Typewriting 2—For employees with skill of 50 w.p.m. and high accuracy. The course includes speed and accuracy drills, correcting of errors, centering and arrangement, tabulations, rough drafts, duplicating, care of equipment and supplies. Instructor, Miss Marian Harlin.

Shorthand 1—For employees with previous training in Gregg shorthand. It serves as a

review of basic shorthand, with emphasis on high-frequency words and phrases. Instructor, Miss Marian Harlin.

Shorthand 2—For employees whose present skill is between 80 and 100 w.p.m. The course aims to increase skill in taking dictation and transcribing, with special attention to the kinds of dictation material used in the Department. Instructor, Miss Marian Harlin.

Shorthand 3—For stenographers with dictation skill of 100 or more w.p.m. Emphasis is placed on special shorthand outlines for Departmental and Foreign Service phraseology, including special shortcuts for technical words and phrases. Instructor, Miss Fairah Cruzan.

A course in conference reporting will be starting soon, for stenographers with dictation skill of 130 or more w.p.m.

For further information, call Miss Katherine Wilkey or Mr. Ralph S. Rowland, extension 2122 or 2742.

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